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ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS AT DE FACTO
CONTROLLED COMPANIES
Gaia Balp *
ABSTRACT
Activist campaigns are likely to increasingly target controlled
companies. Studies concerning activism at controlled companies focus on
shareholder-empowering tools, such as the right to nominate and elect
minority directors on the board, as a pathway for limiting the principalprincipal agency problem. However, not enough attention has been paid to
the distinction between de jure and de facto controlled companies. Building
on a recent case concerning a leading Italian corporation, this Article
analyzes the possible unexpected corporate governance consequences of
successful activist intervention at de facto controlled companies, showing
that, where minority shareholders are granted the right to appoint directors
on the board, such a distinction can be relevant. Under certain conditions,
the interplay of activism, shareholder rights and de facto control can result
in an inefficient corporate governance structure. In situations where
institutional investors make up a significant portion of a company’s
shareholder base, and board representation rights apply, institutions
teaming up with activists can bring about changes in the governance
structure of the firm, particularly at the board level, so substantive that they
reverse the balance of power between minority and majority shareholders—
an outcome not even conceivable at de jure controlled companies. In such
situations, both the disadvantages of not having a controller and those
associated with contestable control combine. In addition, the monitoring
role played by non-activist institutional shareholders becomes pivotal.
Highlighting the potential unexpected corporate governance effects of
activism at de facto controlled companies can help frame the U.S. debate
surrounding shareholder empowerment and refine the claim that activists’
board representation could solve the principal-principal agency problem at
controlled companies as well as complement the skeptical view about
promoting shareholder engagement without more closely considering the
impact of engagement-related costs.
INTRODUCTION
Activist campaigns are not new to the U.S. corporate scene. However,
in recent years they have “spiked, almost hyperbolically.” 1 From 2014 to
2017, the number of companies publicly targeted each year by activists has
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1. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund
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ranged from more than 300 to nearly 500. 2 Hedge funds in particular have
increasingly targeted investee companies with a goal of bringing about
change in their governance practices, business plans and operations, capital
structure or strategic direction, although usually not in their corporate
control. 3 By taking up a significant but non-controlling equity position in a
public company 4 and exercising shareholder rights in a demanding or even
aggressive manner, activists exert pressure on the company to bring about
the changes advocated.5 Activists seek to earn profits by taking advantage
of the increased stock price performance which usually follows such
changes, typically where—as is mostly the case—underperforming firms
are targeted. 6 In fact, activists operate as special information traders, in that
they are ready not only to “spend resources to identify strategic changes that
they believe will increase the share price of the targeted public company,” 7
but also to take large positions in that company and “spend even more
resources to try to get the company to implement those changes.” 8
Depending on the circumstances, activists will push through any strategy
2. See SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, ACTIVIST INSIGHT,
ACTIVIST INVESTING IN EUROPE: A SPECIAL REPORT 3 (2017), https://www.skadden.com/
insights/publications/2017/10/activist-investing-in-europe-a-special-report-2017
[hereinafter
SKADDEN-ACTIVIST INSIGHT].
3. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1060–70 (2007) (illustrating the characteristic
features of hedge fund activism as compared to activism by traditional institutions: the former
being aimed at achieving significant changes in individual companies, rather than small, systemic
changes, entailing higher costs, and being strategic and ex ante, rather than incidental and ex post).
The reasons for these differences lie in the incentive structures of hedge fund managers, and in the
fact that traditional institutional investors are faced with regulatory and political constraints, as
well as conflicts of interest that render activism less profitable for institutional investors as
compared to hedge funds. Id. Moreover, traditional investors pursue a diversification strategy that
is difficult to combine with strategic activism. See also Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The
Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51 (2011)
(distinguishing between hedge funds’ “offensive” activism, as opposed to mainstream institutional
investors’ “defensive” activism).
4. See Marco Becht, Julian Franks, Jeremy Grant & Hannes F. Wagner, Returns to Hedge
Fund Activism: An International Study, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2933, 2934 (2017) (finding that stakes
built up by hedge funds average approximately 11%).
5. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1379
(2007).
6. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional
Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 104–05 (2017) (explaining that activists’ incentives to spend on
stewardship depend on the likeliness of inducing large governance-generated value increases);
Bratton, supra note 5, at 1379 (illustrating that activists’ demands “likely include one or more
actions assuring a quick return on investment—sale of the company at a premium, unbundling of
the company through the sale or spin-off of a large division, or a large cash payment to the
shareholders in the form of a special dividend or share repurchase”); Cheffins & Armour, supra
note 3, at 57 (noting that activist hedge funds’ targets, “despite usually having sound operating
cash flows and returns on assets, typically have a low share price relative to book value and low
dividend payout ratios”).
7. Bernard S. Sharfman, Activist Hedge Funds in a World of Board Independence: Creators
or Destroyers of Long-Term Value, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 813, 829 (2015).
8. Id.
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they believe will correct the target’s underperformance. Therefore, activist
hedge funds are looked upon as actors fueling a “market for corporate
influence”—a market based on stepping-up pressure as minority
shareholders, from persuasion behind the scenes up to a proxy contest for
representation on a company’s board of directors, and ultimately profit on
improved returns that follow responsive changes made by the target’s
management—as opposed to the market for corporate control. 9
In Europe, activist engagement lags behind the United States in terms
of its scale. 10 However, it is significantly on the rise, being driven, at least
in part, by “a higher incidence of foreign activists looking for opportunities
as the U.S. market has become increasingly picked over.” 11 In 2017, more
than 100 European companies were publicly targeted by activists, and the
most high-profile campaigns were often run by U.S. activists; 12 the absolute
number of European companies targeted by non-European activists “was at
a four-year high,” with foreign funds accounting “for around 25% of
campaigns.” 13 With almost three-quarters of foreign campaigns led by U.S.
activists, “U.S. interest in Europe has increased and the groundwork has
been laid for a sustained level of activism.” 14 European targets accounted
for nearly one-quarter of all activist capital deployed and campaigns
launched in the first half of 2018. 15 After the United States, activism among
large economies is “relatively most frequent in Italy, the Netherlands,
Germany and Switzerland (in declining order), none of which are typically
labeled as having active markets for corporate control.” 16 And,
interestingly, in relative terms, activism is “less frequent [in the United
States and the UK] after adjusting for the number of listed companies than
in Italy or Germany.” 17
Recent international empirical research has found activist campaigns to
be fairly successful, in that they very often lead to at least some of the
corporate changes sought, whether regarding payout policy, governance
matters, corporate restructuring or takeovers. 18 Evidence indicates that,
9. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 3, at 59.
10. See SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, ACTIVIST INSIGHT, THE ACTIVIST INVESTING ANNUAL

REVIEW 2018 3 (2018), https://www.activistinsight.com/resources/reports [hereinafter SCHULTE
ROTH & ZABEL-ACTIVIST INSIGHT] (noting that “the bulk of activism continues to take place in
the U.S.”).
11. See SKADDEN-ACTIVIST INSIGHT, supra note 2, at 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See LAZARD, REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM - 1H 2018 1 (2018),
https://www.lazard.com/media/450655/lazards-review-of-shareholder-activism-1h-2018.pdf.
16. Becht et al., supra note 4, at 2940.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2934 (“For the entire sample [of 1,740 activist engagements across twenty-three
countries], the unconditional probability of an activist being successful in achieving at least one
engagement outcome is 53%. However, the incidence of outcomes varies considerably across
countries. In North America activists achieve outcomes in 61% of all engagements and 50% in
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following hedge fund intervention, “target firms tend to decrease their
capital expenditures, increase their payouts, and increase their incidence of
asset divestitures, restructurings, or employee layoffs.” 19 Hedge fund
activism is also “associated with the highest rates of organizational
change.” 20 As a result of their efforts, activists also often obtain board
seats. 21 In the United States, “activists on average have received just over
one board seat for every two campaigns announced in a particular year.” 22
Hence, although only a minority of hedge funds are actually activist
shareholders, 23 activist hedge funds “have an outsized role in the debate
about corporate governance because they have had an important effect on
the manner in which public companies operate.” 24 Indeed, “the emergence
of high profile activists like hedge funds has led to warranted debate as to
the desired level of their involvement in governance.” 25
If costly activist campaigns are often successful, this does not occur
simply due to the sizable stake built up by activists in the targeted company,
but much more so because activist proposals are backed by other investors,
most notably traditional institutions such as actively managed mutual funds,

Europe, but only 18% in Asia.”). Moreover, activism generates “positive alpha on average in large
firms,” although “in all engagements the returns crucially depend on the activist achieving
outcomes.” Id. at 2935. Data referred in this study to the United States is consistent with previous
country-specific research. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge
Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1744 (2008);
April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other
Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 189 (2009). However, by formulating shareholder activism as a
sequential decision process, in which a more hostile tactic is conditional on having passed through
less confrontational stages in order to measure the actual costs of activist monitoring, the overall
success rate of activism has been estimated as 29.17%, lower than other studies. See Nickolay
Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model, 107 J.
FIN. & ECON. 610, 620 (2013).
19. Matthew R. Denes, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Victoria B. McWilliams, Thirty Years of
Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research, 44 J. CORP. FIN. 405, 413 (2017)
(surveying the relevant literature).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Gantchev, supra note 18, at 612 (finding that the activist tactic of requesting
board representation “is effective in 39.33% of the cases”).
22. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2016 U.S. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS
12
(2016),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_
2016_U.S._Shareholder_Activism_Review_and_Analysis.pdf. The article further notes that in
recent years, “approximately 47% of all proxy contests, short or control slates, resulted in the
activist investor obtaining one or more seats on the board.” Id. at 19.
23. Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1046.
24. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on
Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1886
(2017).
25. Yaron Nili, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A New Approach to Shareholder Activism, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 203 (2014) (arguing that the calls for regulatory changes in the United
States are construed both too narrowly, since they target specific activists such as hedge funds,
and too widely, since “calls to import specific arrangements from other jurisdictions [do not
consider] the full spectrum of models of activism”).
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pension funds and passive investors. 26 Due to their business model and
incentive structures, traditional institutions usually adopt a passive, or at
best reactive, stance as regards engagement with investee companies. 27
However, with increasing frequency, institutions are sharing the views of
activists whom they consider to be a credible actors, 28 and are willing to
support their campaigns either privately or publicly and to vote in line with
them at the shareholders’ meeting. 29 More so, proxy advisors’ voting
recommendations often offer additional support to activist campaigns. 30
This institutional support also helps to explain why even large-cap
26. Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an
Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1408, 1415–17 (2014); Ronald J.
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013); see also, e.g., Becht et
al., supra note 4, at 2934; Cheffins & Armour, supra note 3, at 87. For the United States, see Ian
R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, Standing on the Shoulders of the Giants: The
Effect of Passive Investors on Activism (Nat’l Bur. of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22707,
2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22707 (documenting that the rise in passive investing is
associated with more frequent confrontational activist campaigns and a higher likelihood for the
activist to obtain board representation or the sale of the targeted company); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang
& Tao Li, Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fights: How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes
Proxy
Contests
(Colum.
Bus.
Sch.,
Research
Paper
No.
18-16,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3101473 (documenting a positive correlation
between the propensity for targeting by activists and pro-activist voting by mutual funds, so that a
relatively pro-activist shareholder base is a key factor driving activists’ selection of targets).
27. See Serdar Çelik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors as Owners: Who Are They and
What Do They Do? 22–33 (OECD Publ’g, Paris, OECD Corp. Governance Working Papers, No.
11, 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3v1dvmfk42-en; see also ORG. FOR ECON. & COOP. DEV.,
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN PROMOTING GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 19–
63 (2011), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081553.pdf.
28. See SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL-ACTIVIST INSIGHT, supra note 10, at 6 (asserting that
“[i]ncreasingly, an activist’s track record matters,” in terms of its credibility, for the resonance of
its ideas). This is in line with C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy, Randall S. Thomas, The Second
Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP.
FIN. 296, 297 (2016) (finding that some top hedge funds succeed, not merely because of superior
ability to select targets, but because “they acquire a reputation for having the ability to pressure
managers in credible ways,” i.e. for their “‘clout and expertise,’ including the demonstrated ability
to succeed in the most difficult interventions by targeting large firms, launching successful proxy
fights, initiating lawsuits, pressuring target boards using the media, overcoming strong antitakeover defenses, and replacing board members”). Activists’ successes at difficult targets “appear
to result more from board representation, improved performance, and monitoring management
than from capital structure or dividend policy changes.” Id. at 296.
29. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Cindy R. Alexander, Mark A. Chen, Duane J. Seppi & Chester S. Spatt, Interim
News and the Role of Proxy Voting Advice, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 4419, 4433 (2010) (finding that in
44.9% of cases Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommends in favor of the dissident
slate, and that ISS recommendations for the dissident slate increase the probability of victory in
proxy contests by 14% to 30%); Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge
Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 692–93 (2007) (explaining that
“regulatory action mandating responsible fiduciary proxy voting by institutional investors” has
rendered proxy advisors influential, which encouraged shareholder activism, especially hedge
fund activism, due to proxy advisors’ “activist bent” (e.g., by supporting “only the weakest kinds
of poison pills” and supporting dissident candidates and positions at director elections)); Edelman
et al., supra note 26, at 1419–20.
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companies are becoming increasingly targeted by activists, both in the
United States and Europe. 31
Moreover, in a significant number of cases, simply the threat of
aggressive campaigns has resulted in ex ante settlements with the board by
which the activist typically secures representation on the board. 32 This
representation may then allow the activists to facilitate the changes they
seek. 33 Again, the “growing willingness of institutional investors and proxy
advisors to support activists” has been identified as a relevant driver for the
increase in the number of ex ante settlements, which “strengthen[s] the
credibility of the activists’ threat to win seats in a proxy contest.” 34
However, securing representation on the board of directors does not
necessarily mean the activist is likely to commit to its investment over the
long term: although their holding periods have lengthened over time, 35
hedge funds typically exit after a period of no more than two or three years,
or, at any rate, “after a period that is brief in terms of the life cycle of a
corporation or an ordinary human investor.” 36 Therefore, unlike other
investors, employees and corporate creditors, hedge funds usually will not
31. See SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL-ACTIVIST INSIGHT, supra note 10, at 3 (referring to the trend
towards large-cap targets as a “natural result of an increase in the flow of assets to activist funds
based on the success of activist strategies, particularly as a counterbalance to the overall trend of
investors shifting toward passive vehicles”). “The recognition by institutional investors of the
benefits of activism has also increased their willingness to lend support, allowing activists to
engage even larger companies with performance and operational issues.” Id.
32. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 22, at 17–20, 22 (noting that “[s]ince 2013,
companies and activists have been able to settle, on average, one in five proxy contests”). “[I]n the
context of control slates . . . activists have agreed to settle, withdraw or otherwise end their proxy
contests before a vote approximately 57% of the time on average.” Id. at 19.
33. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, Dancing with Activists
26, 32 (Colum. Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 17-44, Harvard Law and Econ., Discussion Paper
No. 906, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2948869 (finding that settlements affecting board
composition are associated with “subsequent increases in CEO turnover, payouts to shareholders,
and the likelihood of a strategic transaction”; no evidence is found that settlements enable activists
to extract significant rents at the expense of other investors by introducing directors not supported
by other investors or by facilitating “greenmail” buybacks of activist shares at a premium over the
market price).
34. Id. at 4; see also SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 22, at 22. However, settlement
agreements are becoming a source of concern for major institutional investors as noted by State
Street Global Advisors Rakhi Kumar and Ron O’Hanley. See Rakhi Kumar & Ron O’Hanley,
Protecting the Interests of Long-Term Shareholders in Activist Engagements, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 17, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2016/10/17/protecting-the-interests-of-long-term-shareholders-in-activist-engagements/
(discussing how “a recent rise in settlement agreements entered into rapidly between boards and
activists and without the voice of long-term shareholders concerns us [(institutional investors)], as
we see evidence of short-term priorities compromising longer-term interests”).
35. See Ethan A. Klingsberg & Elizabeth Bieber, Activism in 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2018/01/29/activism-in-2018/ (noting that “[t]he activists are now regularly holding investments
for four to five years and focusing more consistently during the initial years of their investments
on advocating for operational turnarounds”).
36. Strine, supra note 24, at 1906.
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remain involved long enough to participate fully in the actual long-term
effects of the changes they put in place. 37
The (positive or negative) corporate effects of hedge fund activism have
long been debated. 38 However, even empirical research does not
conclusively support any clear answer to the question as to whether hedge
fund activism is beneficial or detrimental to the interests of the targeted
company and its shareholders, and whether it should therefore be favored or
opposed by regulation. 39
One particularly interesting aspect to the debate on activist engagement
is its focus on whether, and if so how, activism is affected by the structure
of corporate ownership. In effect, activist interventions focus not only on
companies with widely dispersed ownership and no one shareholder
holding a stake large enough to secure voting control, but also on controlled
companies, where the (absolute or relative) majority of the votes are held by
a stockholder or a coalition of shareholders. 40 Minority-empowering
shareholder rights, such as the right to appoint directors on the board,
coupled with institutional voting support of activist proposals, can
encourage activism at controlled companies. 41 One widely shared view
about activism at controlled companies considers how activists exercise a
disciplining effect on the controlling shareholders, in that they help to curb
private benefit extraction at the hands of controlling shareholders by
catalyzing support from institutional shareholders and supporting their
stewardship function. 42 However, as this Article will attempt to show, such
an approach is not comprehensive in relation to cases involving de facto
control.
Studies concerning shareholder activism at controlled companies seem
to feature a significant limitation in that they do not draw a clear dividing
line between de jure and de facto controlled companies. 43 Such distinction
is not a trivial one, as in one recent case concerning the leading Italian
telecommunications company, Telecom Italia,44 has shown: where a
company is under de facto control and minority-empowering devices
apply—specifically, board representation rights—activist engagement can
bring about substantial changes in the governance structure of the firm,
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1928.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
A de jure controlling stockholder holds an absolute majority of the voting rights; a de facto
controlling shareholder does not, but is nonetheless able to actually control voting outcomes and
the corporation due to the particular circumstances—the composition of the shareholder base, with
small and very small passive minority shareholders who do not participate in the governance of
the company, low voter turnout, etc. See infra Part III.
44. See infra Part IV.
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typically at the board level, and even terminate control, regardless of any
change in the company’s ownership and the associated voting rights. 45
The Telecom Italia case calls for an assessment of the possible
corporate governance consequences of activist engagement at de facto
controlled companies that may arise out of the interplay between factual
circumstances and regulatory tools. Although the possible consequences of
potentially unexpected outcomes of such interplay cannot be predicted in a
straightforward manner, an activist’s power to exert substantial influence
over the company’s management premised on a small equity stake, coupled
with the presence of a much larger, but (theoretically) disempowered,
blockholder is likely to cause instability at the corporate-governance level.
This further enhances the essential gatekeeping role played by mainstream
institutional investors, with dubious results in terms of the efficiency of
corporate governance. Analyzing the possible unexpected effects of activist
engagement at de facto controlled companies is of interest (also) from the
U.S. perspective. In effect, concentrated ownership is also significant in the
United States, 46 and U.S.-based controlled companies are not immune from
being targeted by activists. 47 Moreover, from the standpoint of the
regulatory implications of activism at controlled companies, the adoption of
minority-empowering tools that feature similarities with the Italian slate
voting system for board elections 48—which has been key in the Telecom
Italia case—is supported within U.S. literature as an effective instrument
for enhancing both controller accountability to public investors and board
independence when dealing with conflicted decisions. 49
This Article proceeds as follows. Based on findings from empirical
research, Part I provides an overview of the ambiguous corporate effects of
activist hedge fund engagement with investee companies. Part II focuses on
the impact of the corporate ownership structure on activism, highlighting
minority-empowering shareholder rights, such as a voice in board elections,
as one of the drivers of activist intervention at controlled companies.
45. See infra Part IV.
46. See, e.g., Edward Kamonjoh, Controlled Companies in the Standard & Poor’s 1500: A

Follow-up Review of Performance & Risk, INV. RESP. RES. CTR. INST. 15 (2016),
https://www.issgovernance.com/library/controlled-companies-standard-poors-1500-followreview-performance-risk/ (reporting that, as of October 2015, 7% of the constituents of the S&P
1500 index were controlled firms: “there are two primary control mechanisms in the updated
study group: 1) multi-class capital structures with unequal voting rights (78 study companies); and
2) control through ownership of at least 30 percent of a class of single-vote stock by a person or
group (27 firms)”); see infra Part II–III.
47. See infra Part II.
48. Under slate voting, the board of directors is elected from competing slates (or “lists”) of
nominees, which are usually submitted by sponsoring shareholders. The majority of directors will
be elected from the slate that received the largest number of votes at the shareholders’ meeting
(so-called “majority slate”), but at least one director must be picked from the slate that obtained
the largest number of votes after the majority slate (so-called “minority slate”). See infra Part II.
49. See infra Part II.
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Against this background, and based on a discussion of the general
implications drawn from the Telecom Italia case, Part III and IV argue that
it is necessary to draw a clearer divide between de jure and de facto
controlled companies when analyzing the corporate-governance effects of
activism at controlled companies: in point of actual fact, activist
intervention can potentially affect de facto controlled companies, along with
the balance of interests surrounding it, far more substantially than de jure
controlled, or widely held, companies. Next, Part V analyzes the definition
of a (de facto) controlling shareholder and the corporate-governance
consequences of corporate control in terms of a controller’s fiduciary
duties. Taking account of these consequences, Part VI assesses the potential
upsides and downsides of the rise in cooperation between activists and
institutional investors in terms of possible corporate-governance
consequences at companies dominated by a de facto controller. The
gatekeeping and stewardship functions of institutional investors’ is bound to
remain pivotal in order to counteract the inefficiency plausibly affecting a
firm’s corporate governance following successful activist intervention. This
analysis will help frame the debate concerning shareholder empowerment
and the regulatory implications of activism.
I. THE AMBIGUOUS CORPORATE EFFECTS OF ACTIVIST
ENGAGEMENTS
As has been noted by Chief Justice Strine, “[f]ew topics are sexier
among commentators on corporate governance now than whether activist
hedge funds are good for, a danger to, or of no real consequence to public
corporations and the people who depend upon them.” 50 The question as to
whether positive or negative externalities are associated with hedge fund
activism has long been debated, but is as yet unresolved, sharply dividing
activists’ supporters and opponents. 51 Even empirical evidence concerning
the long-term effects and other aspects of activist hedge fund interventions
is not straightforward.
A. ARGUMENTS FOR ACTIVISTS
Those who view activists as valuable corporate monitors that benefit all
shareholders and advocate for enhanced shareholder power argue that
activist intervention, including investment-limiting and adversarial
interventions, does not create short-term gains at the expense of long-term

50. Strine, supra note 24, at 1871.
51. See Simone M. Sepe, Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1377,

1379 (2017) (noting that in the current corporate environment, the debate on the optimal allocation
of power between boards and shareholders “has intensified due to recent developments—such as
the rise of hedge fund activism—which have shifted the balance of corporate power from boards
to shareholders”).
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performance. 52 On the contrary, there is no evidence that the positive stockprice increase that normally accompanies activist intervention is followed
by negative abnormal returns over a five-year period. 53 Moreover, no
evidence has been found regarding “pump-and-dump patterns” in which the
departure of an activist is followed by abnormal negative returns over a
three-year window. 54
Rather, further evidence highlighted an increase in operating
performance at firms targeted by hedge funds. 55 Activism has been
associated with positive externalities on industry peers: peers that are not
targeted are induced to respond proactively to the threat of possible activist
intervention by implementing policy changes that mimic those undertaken
by targeted firms. 56 This apparently results in reduced agency costs,
improved operating performance and higher stock valuations. 57
Based on these findings, activist shareholders seem to be far from
having detrimental effects on the interests of targeted companies and their
long-term shareholders, and therefore, can be viewed in a favorable light.
Furthermore, activists are considered an essential factor that promotes
institutional investor stewardship.58 Under this view, “specialists in
monitoring combine through the capital markets with specialists in low-cost
diversification to provide a form of market-based stewardship.” 59 In fact,
“[a]s governance intermediaries or governance arbitrageurs, activist
shareholders can, in the right circumstances, serve to reduce the market’s
undervaluation of governance rights to the advantage of all shareholders.” 60

52. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism, 115 COL. L. REV. 1085, 1150–54 (2015) (arguing that their findings: (i) “weaken the
case for using staggered boards and weigh in favor of having annual elections for all directors,” as
well as of “reforms that provide shareholders with candidates on the corporate ballot, and they
undermine a key objection to an effective shareholder franchise”; (ii) “eliminate a key motivation
for proposals to limit the rights of short-term shareholders”; (iii) “weigh against a tightening of
disclosure rules that would discourage and reduce the incidence of such activism”; and (iv)
“should inform how corporate directors view and engage with activists,” in that “boards should be
open to the activist’s ideas and to discussing them with the activist”). It should be noted that
findings from event studies regarding short-term stock returns associated with the announcement
of activist engagements mostly converge. For a survey of the relevant literature, see Denes et al.,
supra note 19, at 410.
53. Bebchuck et al., supra note 52, at 1130.
54. Id. at 1134–35.
55. See Denes et al., supra note 19, at 411–12.
56. See Nickolay Gantchev, Oleg Gredil & Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Governance Under the
Gun: Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism 2, 4 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI), Working Paper
No. 562/2018, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2356544.
57. Id.
58. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 26, at 867.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 877.
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B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ACTIVISTS
Those who oppose challenging the centrality of the board by adopting
legal rules and corporate arrangements that facilitate activism rely instead
on evidence “supporting the view that the substantial private gains hedge
funds realize through activism come at the expense of long-term firm value,
rather than from the activists’ ability to hold managers more accountable.” 61
First, selection effects undermine the reliability of empirical results. 62
In particular, any findings that a set of comparable control firms not
targeted by activists have better long-term financial performance compared
to targeted firms underpin the claim that the value increases following
hedge fund interventions are unlikely to be caused directly by activist
actions. 63 Rather, “other governance mechanisms or actors have been on
average more successful than the typical activist hedge fund in turning these
relatively poorly performing firms around.” 64 A study focusing on Germany
draws a distinction between more and less aggressive hedge fund
engagements, finding that “more aggressive hedge funds generated only
initially higher returns and their outperformance quickly reversed, whereas
non-aggressive hedge funds ultimately outperformed their aggressive
peers.” 65 Another study evaluated the impact of activist interventions on
shareholder wealth and the market at-large by taking account of the
distribution of returns across larger and smaller firms and, in particular,
value-weighted average long-term stock returns, finding no strong support
to the hypothesis that activist interventions drive long-term benefits for the
typical shareholder. 66
61. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Activist Hedge Funds and the
Corporation, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 261, 264 (2016) (claiming that re-empowering U.S. corporate
boards by restoring their ability to use defensive measures such as staggered boards to resist
activist hedge fund interventions would effectively secure a firm’s commitment to long-term value
creation); see also Yvan Allaire & François Dauphin, “Activist” Hedge Funds: Creators of
Lasting Wealth? What Do the Empirical Studies Really Say?, INST. FOR GOVERNANCE OF PRIV.
AND PUB. ORGS. 2 (July 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2460920
(highlighting the “limit[ations] of econometric tool kit[s]” and their “weak ability to cope with
complex phenomena”).
62. See Martijn Cremers, Erasmo Giambona, Simone M. Sepe & Ye Wang, Hedge Fund
Activism, Firm Valuation and Stock Returns 2–3 (June 16, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693231&download=yes.
63. See id. at 3, 21, 37 (explaining that “selection effects arise because hedge funds tend to
target underperforming firms so that endogenous turnaround actions by managers and directors of
targeted firms, rather than hedge fund activism per se, could explain any subsequent change in the
targets’ corporate policies and valuations”). Additional qualitative evidence seems to further
confirm this view. See Cremers et al., supra note 61, at 285–94.
64. Cremers et al., supra note 61, at 284.
65. Wolfgang Bessler, Wolfgang Drobetz & Julian Holler, The Returns to Hedge Fund
Activism in Germany, 21 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 106, 106, 109 (2015) (suggesting that aggressive
hedge funds attempt to expropriate the target firm’s shareholders by exiting at temporarily
increased share prices).
66. See Ed deHaan, David F. Larcker & Charles McClure, Long-Term Economic
Consequences of Hedge Fund Activist Interventions 7 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Gov. at Stan. U.,
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Second, activism couples with market imperfections to increase the risk
of mistakenly removing sound managers or forcing inefficient changes in a
firm’s policies. 67 Since market prices do not immediately reflect the private
information available to directors and managers until the implications of
that information show up in cash flows, “shareholders may take the fall in
short-term stock prices following the undertaking of a profitable long-term
project to signal managerial underperformance and, hence, rationally decide
to remove the manager or seek other changes in existing firm policies, or
otherwise dump their shares, increasing the likelihood of a change in
control.” 68 This is referred to as the “limited commitment problem” which
affects shareholders as a consequence of market imperfections. 69 The costs
associated with the limited commitment problem include those arising from
the increased likelihood that “ex ante, fear of shareholder retribution will
induce managers to pass up profitable long-term projects that are more
likely to be associated with lower short-term firm outcomes or overinvest in
less profitable short-term projects.” 70 Based on evidence that the relative
underperformance of firms targeted by activists (as compared to control
firms) is more pronounced at firms that rely either on research and
development (R&D) investments, intangible assets and patents on the one
hand, or on longer-term stakeholder relationships on the other hand,
activism is deemed “to exacerbate the limited commitment problem.” 71
While noting that R&D expenditures tighten following activist
interventions, supporters of activism highlight further findings that
innovation output (as measured by patent counts and citations) increases at
targeted companies, and hence conclude that activist-driven “[r]eallocation
of innovative resources, redeployment of human capital, and change to
board-level expertise all contribute to improve target firms’ innovation.” 72
However, the view that activism has a perverse deterrent effect on
management’s long-term focus by distorting ex-ante incentives of both
managers and other stakeholders to invest optimally in the firm is not an
isolated one. Findings that R&D investments decrease following activist
intervention appear to be particularly worrisome because they suggest that
“hedge fund activism may be leading to a broad and systemic shift by
American corporations from investment to payout and particularly toward
Working Paper No. 236; Stan. U. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 18-47; Eur. Corp.
Gov. Inst. (ECGI), Finance Working Paper No. 577/2018, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3260095.
67. Cremers et al., supra note 61, at 278.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 285.
72. Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Song Ma & Xuan Tian, How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape
Corporate Innovation?, J. OF FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn
.com/abstract=2409404.
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avoidance of investments in R&D.” 73 Moreover, the extent to which activist
campaigns deter overall R&D investments should also be measured by
considering non-targeted firms’ ex ante responsiveness to the threat of
possible activist intervention. 74 The implementation of activist proposals to
limit investments may well result in increased returns on assets; 75 however,
the question remains as to whether the price paid for achieving such
increased returns might subsequently turn out to have been simply too high.
In defense of activist investment-limiting proposals, it has been argued
that the reining in of investments effectively curbs the management’s bias
towards inefficient expansion and empire building. 76 However, that
argument has been objected to as being outdated: usually, any increase in a
firm’s size adversely affects stock price growth, which does not have the
effect of inflating executive pay wherever—as is increasingly
commonplace—compensation is equity-based rather than cash-based. 77 In
addition—with the plausible exception of a few limited cases 78—there is
little reason to believe that an activist has superior knowledge, skills or
expertise at running the business, as compared to the firm’s management. 79
Hence, limiting management’s discretion “through sudden and concealed
activist campaigns would not necessarily lead to optimal outcomes.” 80 After

73. Coffee & Palia, supra note 1, at 593 (drawing attention to the recent activist interventions
at Allergan and DuPont as illustrating examples).
74. Id. at 594.
75. See Heqing Zhu, The Preventive Effect of Hedge Fund Activism, SOC. SCI RESEARCH
NETWORK 36 (Nov. 1, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2369533 (finding that “in proactive
response to an increase in the likelihood of hedge fund intervention, firms cut CEO pay, reduce
cash holdings and leverage, limit capital investment and R&D expenses, and raise shareholder
distributions and CEO turnover”). “As a result of these policy improvements, return on assets
increases significantly.” Id.
76. See Nickolay Gantchev, Merih Sevilir & Anil Shivdasani, Activism and Empire Building 2
(Kelley Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 17-74; SMU Cox Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 1810; Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI), Finance Working Paper No. 575/2018, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3062998 (suggesting that activists perform an influential governance
role in the market for corporate control by disciplining inefficient acquirers, hence mitigating
value destruction from empire building).
77. Coffee & Palia, supra note 1, at 593–94.
78. See Strine, supra note 24, at 1908–09 (acknowledging that, in some cases, owing to the
funds’ track record and its managers management expertise, the activist may assume “the duties
and economic consequences of becoming a genuine fiduciary with duties to other stockholders
and of holding its position for a period of five to ten years, during which it is a constructive
participant in helping the rest of the board and management improve a lagging company,” and
indicating Nelson Peltz—having been “a successful CEO of several businesses for decades, and []
applauded for his willingness to get into the thicket of important work when serving on target
boards”—and his Trian Fund Management as a possible example: “[p]recisely because in this
story the hedge fund is not really short-term, at least in comparison to the rest of the participants in
our short-term markets, whatever business ideas it has are likely to be ones that have to consider
long-term effects more closely”).
79. Id. at 1953–54.
80. Coffee & Palia, supra note 1, at 593–94 (also noting that some campaigns might not be
based on sound strategies but be initiated mainly in order “to roil the waters on the premise that
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all, most hedge fund managers are financial experts, and not operational or
management experts, and have no special skills in the specific business of
their target firms. 81
Third, the view that hedge fund activism is beneficial overall is
challenged by findings which suggest that hedge fund interventions expose
target firms’ creditors and employees to adverse outcomes. 82 Following
activist intervention, “the average bankruptcy risk measure is 10% higher
for the targeted firms than for the controls in the first three years and is l1%
higher thereafter.” 83 Activists advocate the implementation of riskier
projects or an increase in financial leverage because these measures are
usually associated with positive short-term stock returns. 84 Thus, activism
increases corporate risk-taking and heightens the risk of wealth-transfers
from creditors to shareholders. 85 Further, studies found that despite
improved production and labor efficiency following hedge fund activism,
workers’ productivity-adjusted wages stagnate. 86 This indicates that
workers “relinquish most of the surplus to equity investors after hedge fund
intervention.” 87 In addition, defined benefit employee pension plans of
target firms have experienced greater underfunding in the wake of hedge
fund activism. 88 This suggests that “[s]hareholder gains from activism
appear to partly come from raiding deferred compensation promised to
workers” and, potentially, taxpayers (owing to the guarantees provided in
the event of a default by the sponsoring employer). 89

noisy activism will be read by the market as signaling a possible takeover or restructuring,”
allowing the activist to profit therefrom by exiting at an early point).
81. Brav et al., supra note 18, at 1755; Strine, supra note 24, at 1953–54.
82. See Cremers et al., supra note 61, at 298–99.
83. Id. at 300.
84. Id. at 299.
85. April Klein & Emanuel Zur, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm’s
Existing Bondholders, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1735–37, 1766 (2011) (finding that abnormal
stockholder returns are negatively related to the abnormal bondholder returns for both short-run
and long-run windows, which underpins the view that activist intervention can result in wealth
transfers to the detriment of corporate creditors). Also, findings that “bond returns are inversely
related to subsequent changes in dividends and leverage and directly related to subsequent
changes in cash on hand and assets” are deemed “consistent with the view that, on average, hedge
fund activism increases credit risk.” Id. at 1736. But see Brav et al., supra note 18, at 1732
(finding instead that hedge fund activism is unlikely to shift wealth from the creditors to the
shareholders). One recent study further suggests that “banks adjust their loan pricing [following
activist intervention] to reflect their concerns about wealth expropriation.” See Sandeep Dahiya,
Issam Hallak & Thomas Matthys, Targeted by an Activist Hedge Fund, Do the Lenders Care?,
SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK 1 (June 4, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191072.
86. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism:
Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2723, 2726 (2015).
87. Id.
88. See Anup Agrawal & Yuree Lim, The Dark Side of Hedge Fund Activism: Evidence from
Employee Pension Plans, 29TH ANN. CONF. ON FIN. ECON. & ACCT. 2018 3 (Sept. 29, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3000596.
89. Id. at 1.
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The positive picture which portrays hedge funds as providers of a
market-driven corrective for managerial moral hazard 90 has also been called
into question based on, amongst other things, findings that despite public
criticism of excessive executive pay as an established activist strategy,
activism does not lead to significant changes in executive compensation at
targeted firms over the long term compared to compensation levels at
control firms. 91 This casts doubts on the ability of activists to effectively
discipline entrenched managers. 92
Finally, hedge fund representation in the board of directors is associated
with an increase in informed trading in the corporation’s stock, suggesting
that activist board representation imposes new agency costs through
widened bid/ask spreads and informed trading. 93
Based on these findings, it would appear on the whole that
corporations, including well-run, high-performing companies, are
increasingly faced with:
(1) pressure to deliver short-term results at the expense of long-term
value, whether through excessive risk-taking . . . , avoiding investments
that have long-term horizons or taking on substantial leverage to fund
buybacks and special payouts to shareholders; (2) challenges in trying to
balance competing interests due to excessively empowered special interest
and activist shareholders; and (3) significant strain from the misallocation
of corporate resources and energy into mandated activist or governance
initiatives that provide no meaningful benefit to investors or other critical
stakeholders. 94

90. In principal-agent relationships, the problem of moral hazard is one of incentives. See
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives,
in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY 107 (John J. McCall, ed., U. of
Chicago Press, 1982) (“[I]n a corporation owned by many small shareholders there is an
‘incentive problem’; i.e., the managers (or directors) have goals of their own, such as the
enjoyment of perquisites or the maximization of their own income, which are at variance with the
goals of shareholders, which we assume to be profit or market value maximization.”).
91. Cremers et al., supra note 61, at 303. But see Jana P. Fidrmuc & Swati Kanoria, Hedge
Fund
Activism
and
CEO
Compensation
2–4
(Oct.
4,
2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3047917 (finding that: (i) activist hedge funds reduce excess overall
CEO pay; and (ii) pay-for-performance sensitivity decreases after activism: a result conjectured to
reflect monitoring by activist hedge funds, which substitutes for incentive-laden compensation in
motivating CEOs to improve firm value).
92. Cremers et al., supra note 61, at 303.
93. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Joshua R. Mitts & Robert E. Bishop,
Activist Directors and Agency Costs: What Happens When an Activist Director Goes on the
Board? 2 (Colum. Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 18-15, 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3100995.
94. Martin Lipton, Will a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance Bring Peace?, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 15, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2015/10/05/will-a-new-paradigm-for-corporate-governance-bring-peace/.

356

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 13

II. ACTIVISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
OWNERSHIP
One increasingly significant aspect to the debate concerning activism
lies in its focus on whether, and if so how, activism is affected by the
structure of corporate ownership. In keeping with the fact that activist
campaigns need to attract the support of other investors to be successful,
hedge funds primarily seek out targets whose shareholder base features a
significant proportion of institutional investors.95 This, however, does not
necessarily mean that activists only focus on companies with widely
dispersed ownership. In fact, activist intervention also occurs at controlled
companies, where gaining influence over the company and the votes at
shareholder meetings should reasonably be expected to be more
challenging. 96 This suggests that dispersed ownership can no longer
typically be regarded as “a necessary precondition for an influence-based
intervention.” 97
Probably the most apparent indication that activism actually occurs at
controlled companies is drawn from experience within European countries,
where concentrated corporate ownership prevails. 98 Although in France and
Germany activists target companies with relatively dispersed ownership,99
in Italy—a country known for high levels of ownership concentration—
activist hedge funds have “taken position in a great variety of listed
companies regardless of the presence of controlling shareholders.” 100 As
mentioned above, after the United States, activism is relatively more
frequent in Italy. 101
Although concentrated ownership helps to explain why Europe lags
behind the United States in terms of the overall level of activist
95. Becht et al., supra note 4, at 2936.
96. See, e.g., Wolf-Georg Ringe, Shareholder Activism: A Renaissance, in THE OXFORD

HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 393–94 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg
Ringe eds., 2018) (“It is, first of all, more difficult to push through activist initiatives for minority
shareholders in a controlled firm, since the ‘controller’ normally has the voting power to sanction
the incriminated act or behavior. Second, the minority activist will usually find it more difficult to
argue their case, and to show that their own ideas will benefit all shareholders, not just the
majority.”).
97. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 3, at 69 (in fact acknowledging that exceptions can exist).
98. On the international structure of corporate ownership and their patterns, see generally,
more recently, Gur Aminadav & Elias Papaioannou, Corporate Control around the World (Nat’l
Bur. of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23010, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23010 (where
extensive references can be found).
99. See Becht et al., supra note 4, at 2968.
100. Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated Ownership Structure: An
Empirical Analysis of Hedge Fund Activism in Italy and Germany, and Its Evolution, 10 EUR.
COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 328, 354, 358 (2013) (further noting that “differences in the ownership
structure of the target companies also seem to have had no impact on activists’ investment
choices”); see also Becht et al., supra note 4, at 2940 (documenting that after the United States,
activism is relatively more frequent in Italy).
101. See Becht et al., supra note 4, at 2940.
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engagement, 102 at European controlled companies, activists can exercise a
wider range of powers granted to the shareholders as compared to the
powers available to U.S. shareholders. Activists can exert pressure on the
controlling shareholder and the company’s management by exploiting
minority shareholder protection rights provided for under European
Member State national law. 103 In this respect, it is important to stress that,
in 2007 and 2017, the European Union (EU) adopted Shareholder Rights
Directives (SRD I 104 and SRD II 105), which are explicitly intended to
enhance shareholders’ rights and to encourage shareholder participation and
engagement with investee companies, thus also paving the way for
increased activism. 106 Especially where the shareholder base includes U.S.
institutional investors—as is increasingly the case throughout Europe 107—
this factor seems to provide further support for activism. In fact, U.S.

102. See id. at 2944, 2968 (illustrating that blockholders, such as families or founders and
employee shareholders, will generally support the incumbent, and that activists more easily target
companies where blocks are largely absent and that are more susceptible to the votes of foreign
institutional shareholders).
103. For references to Italy, see Erede, supra note 100, at 359; Nili, supra note 25, at 192
(noting that “when the relationship route fails, some hedge funds do resort to more aggressive
tactics by going directly and openly against the controlling shareholder, leading public campaigns,
and trying to sway other shareholders, the public, and regulators against management”).
104. Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on
the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J. (L 184) 17 [hereinafter
SRD I] (introducing new rules on transparency regarding the information provided prior to the
meeting: timely and fast access to such information (Article 5); voting by proxy (Article 10);
participation in general meetings at a distance via electronic means (Article 8); voting by
correspondence (Article 12); granting shareholders the right to place items on the agenda and to
table draft resolutions concerning agenda items, subject to a threshold (if any) not exceeding 5%
of the company’s share capital (Article 6); and to ask questions concerning agenda items, which
the company is required to answer (Article 9)).
105. Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017
amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder
engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132) 1 [hereinafter SRD II].
106. See María Gutiérrez & Maribel Sáez Lacave, Strong Shareholders, Weak Outside
Investors, 18:2 J. CORP. L. STUD. 277, 302 (2018).
107. According to the European Commission, non-national shareholders—most of which are
institutional intermediaries—hold some 44% of the shares issued by EU listed companies.
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council Amending Directive
2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder Engagement and
Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Certain Elements of the Corporate Governance Statement, at 3,
COM
(2014)
213
final,
2014/0121
(COD)
(Apr.
9,
2014),
https://eurlex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:59fccf6c-c094-11e3-86f901aa75ed71a1.0003.01/DOC_1&format=PDF. A substantial proportion of shares in EU listed
companies under foreign ownership is held by large U.S.-based investors: for the UK, see OFF.
FOR NAT’L STAT., Ownership of UK Quoted Shares: 2016, para. 3, 5, 11,
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquotedsh
ares/2016.
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institutional investors exerted significant influence on the level of activism
in non-U.S. countries. 108
Given the prominent role played by U.S.-based actors, it is not
surprising that activism at controlled companies occurs in the United States
as well. In spite of the prevailing widely dispersed corporate ownership
structures, controlled companies have been on the rise in recent years, at
least partly as a result of the increasing trend to go public with a dual class
structure. 109 In particular, activism at U.S. controlled companies is more
consistent where encouraged by “a few motivating forces that increase
activists’ bargaining power vis-à-vis controllers,” such as, most
importantly, “the ability to nominate and elect minority directors in certain
dual-class firms or effectively-controlled firms . . . .” 110 In particular, public
shareholders’ ability in certain U.S. dual-class firms to nominate and elect
minority representatives to the board accounts for a significant share of
publicly-disclosed engagements with controlled companies, and generated a
high success rate. 111
This finding allows a parallel to be drawn with European-style
minority-empowering shareholder rights such as the right to a voice in
board elections, which are arguably some of the most effective means of
ensuring consideration for minority interests and enhancing oversight over
the controlling shareholders or management. 112 The Italian regime for
108. See Becht et al., supra note 4, at 2968–69 (noting that “[t]he increase and spread of U.S.
foreign institutional holdings has significantly contributed to hedge fund activism becoming a
global phenomenon”).
109. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling
Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1279 (2017); Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Ownership
and Long-Term Shareholder Value, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53, 56–57 (2018) (citing well-known
U.S. examples); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1660 (2006); Gutiérrez &
Sáez Lacave, supra note 106, at 281 (noting that “[a]s controlled firms grow in importance,
tunneling, self-dealing, and other types of investor expropriation could become significant
concerns in the US”).
110. Kobi Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies, 2016
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 60, 67–68 (2016); see also Cheffins & Armour, supra note 3, at 69
(mentioning the right to select a director in a company that provides for cumulative voting for
directors as a means by which to put pressure on a company’s dominant shareholder and its
directors).
111. Kastiel, supra note 110, at 90, 93–94 (explaining that due to past restraints, major U.S.
exchanges imposed on the use of dual-class structures; up “until the mid-1980s, controllers who
wanted to use a dual-class structure in order to maintain control over the company even when they
liquidated some of their position had no choice but to provide public holders with the right to elect
minority directors”).
112. While the Italian slate voting regime is quite unique, other countries provide shareholder
minorities with different forms of special legal appointment rights to the board: specifically,
Poland, Spain and Austria provide for cumulative voting. For an overview, see Paul Davies, Klaus
J. Hopt, Richard Nowak & Gerard Van Solinge, Boards in Law and Practice: A Cross-Country
Analysis in Europe, in CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW AND PRACTICE 41–42 (Oxford Uni. Press
Ed., 2013). Minority-elected directors are viewed as a viable regulatory option to possibly be
introduced in other European countries in order to counter the principal-principal conflicts, which
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corporate elections at listed companies is particularly illustrative of this
aspect. In fact, the Italian regime is considered with some interest within
U.S. literature. 113 Based on the mandatory adoption of the so-called slate
voting system, the Italian regime is intended to ensure that at least one of
the seats on the board is reserved for minorities, provided that minority
shareholders actually submit a slate of nominees to be voted on at the
shareholders’ meeting. 114 Such system offers minority shareholders a
relatively easy way of gaining access to the boardroom and obtaining direct
insight into the company’s affairs. Activation of this pathway requires a
willingness to submit a slate of director nominees to be voted on according
to the applicable rules and procedures, and to bear the (non-negligible) cost
associated. 115 Importantly, alongside the shift towards the institutionalinvestor friendly “record date” system for identifying shareholders who are
entitled to vote at the general meeting, 116 the right to elect minority
are typical for concentrated ownership, more effectively than through independent directors. See
María Gutiérrez & Maribel Sáez, Deconstructing Independent Directors, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 63,
65 (2013).
113. See Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435,
498 (2012); David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside-Out Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 147, 163
(2011); Danielle Vukovich, Proxy Access Voting: Evaluating Proxy Access and the Recent
Phenomenon of Corporations Adopting Shareholder Protective Policies, 19 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
437, 466–67 (2018); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 109, at 1291; Kastiel, supra note 110, at
128–29.
114. See Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58, Art. 147-ter (It.) (Consolidated Law on
Finance), available in English at http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/laws-andregulations/documenti/english/laws/fr_decree58_1998.htm (stating that shareholders holding a
minimum threshold of shares—set by the Italian Supervisory Authority and currently varying
between 0.5% and 4.5%—can present lists of candidates for election to the board). At least one
member must be elected from the minority slate, having obtained the largest number of votes, and
this person must not be linked in any way, even indirectly, to the shareholders who presented or
voted on the list which received the largest number of votes. Id. According to the Italian
Supervisory Authority, 96—out of 242—listed companies’ boards currently include at least one
minority-appointed director. See COMMISSIONE NAZIONALE PER LE SOCIETÀ E LA BORSA
(CONSOB), REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF ITALIAN LISTED COMPANIES 15 (2017),
http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/report-on-corporate-governance.
Moreover,
several bylaws, especially of larger corporations, have actually made room for two or three
minority-appointed directors, and the average number of directors appointed by the minority is
approximately two. Piergaetano Marchetti, Gianfranco Siciliano & Marco Ventoruzzo, Disclosing
Directors 7 (Bocconi Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 3264763; Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI),
Law Working Paper No. 420/2018, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3264763.
115. The fact that setting up a slate of director nominees is costly may indirectly be inferred
from the practice of slate voting in Italy. In fact, since the adoption of the slate voting system for
board elections, the Italian Investment Managers Association (Assogestioni)—a non-profit
association representing most of the Italian and foreign asset managers operating in Italy—has
been playing a central role in selecting candidates and submitting minority slates, hence serving as
a tool to minimize members’ engagement-related costs. See Giovanni Strampelli, How to Enhance
Directors’ Independence at Controlled Companies, 44 J. CORP. L. 103, 136 (2018); see also infra
note 139 and accompanying text.
116. In many EU Member States—amongst which Italy—share blocking during a certain period
in advance of the general meeting, and up to the end of the meeting, was a requirement for
participation and voting prior to enactment of SRD I. Share blocking was found to inhibit
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directors under slate voting has favored activism at companies listed in
Italy. 117
At any rate, aside from the Italian slate voting system for corporate
elections, the link between shareholders’ rights and an activist’s ability to
convincingly engage with targeted companies regarding corporate
governance or performance matters has been empirically tested.118 This
relationship is one of dependency: specifically, the frequency of activist
intervention increases depending upon the extent to which shareholder
rights are protected from managerial discretion.119
Against this backdrop, one view of activism at controlled companies is
that:
in cases of corporations dominated by controlling shareholders where the
agency cost shifts from being one between managers and shareholders to
one between controlling and minority shareholders, activist initiatives are
aimed at curbing private benefit extraction by controlling shareholders.
Hedge fund activists seek to discipline controlling shareholders by

institutional shareholder voting, since it overly restricted their ability to trade their shares.
Therefore, share blocking was prohibited and replaced by a system based on a “record date.” See
SRD I, supra note 104, at Art. 7(1)(a) and 7(2) (stating, respectively, that: “the rights of a
shareholder to participate in a general meeting and to vote in respect of any of his shares are not
subject to any requirement that his shares be deposited with, or transferred to, or registered in the
name of, another natural or legal person before the general meeting”; and that “the rights of a
shareholder to participate in a general meeting and to vote in respect of his shares shall be
determined with respect to the shares held by that shareholder on a specified date prior to the
general meeting (the record date)”). Under the record date scheme, the shareholders entitled to
vote are those of record as of a specified cut-off date in advance of the general meeting,
irrespective of whether such formally entitled shareholders will actually still hold their shares on
the day of the meeting. See id. at Art. 7(1)(b) (“[T]he rights of a shareholder to sell or otherwise
transfer his shares during the period between the record date . . . and the general meeting . . . are
not subject to any restriction to which they are not subject at other times . . . .”) Therefore,
shareholders may attend a meeting and exercise voting rights even if they transfer their shares
after the record date.
117. See Massimo Belcredi & Luca Enriques, Institutional Investor Activism in a Context of
Concentrated Ownership and High Private Benefits of Control: The Case of Italy 20–22, 31 (Eur.
Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI), Working Paper No. 225/2013, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325421
(further noting the rise, in recent years, of hedge funds successfully resorting to legal tools and
remedies made available by reforms in the last two decades to aggressively targeting listed
companies engaging in controversial transactions); see also Elisabetta Bellini, Hedge Fund
Activism in Italy, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 201, 231, 233 (2009).
118. See Dionysia Katelouzou, Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism: Dimensions and Legal
Determinants, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 789, 830–52 (2015).
119. Id. at 853 (mentioning the right to exercise a veto over board initiatives, to appoint and
remove directors, and to bring litigation as effective levers by which to affect changes in corporate
policy and governance: “the ability of activist hedge funds to engage with directors of companies
on issues concerning the corporate governance or the performance of the target company is largely
dependent on the law protecting shareholder rights—meaning . . . legal rules governing the scope
that activist hedge funds have to utilize the shareholder decision–making procedures to affect
changes in corporate policy and governance, to exercise a veto over board initiatives, to appoint
and remove directors, and to bring litigation”).
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cooperating with fellow minority shareholders and utilizing the protective
tools granted by the legal regime to minority shareholders. 120

Anecdotal evidence from Italy suggests that activist initiatives seem to
seek “to curb the extraction of private benefits by dominant
shareholders.” 121
There is considerable support for the argument that activist intervention
can play a beneficial corporate-governance role by catalyzing support from
traditional institutional investors and stimulating the exercise of their
stewardship function. 122 Where evidence supporting the value-enhancing
view of activist engagements is relied on, the regulatory implication drawn
regarding shareholder empowerment in the United States is that
shareholders unaffiliated with the controllers should be granted the right to
elect minority directors to potentially “make controlling shareholders more
accountable to other public shareholders by creating an effective platform
for activist involvement.” 123
120. Alexandros Seretakis, Hedge Fund Activism Coming to Europe: Lessons from the
American Experience, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 438, 450–51, 455 (2014) (adding that it
is “crucial . . . that activist hedge funds are not controlling shareholders able to impose their
desired changes in the company’s strategy or governance, but rather large influential shareholders
who invest in monitoring and propose value-enhancing changes to other shareholders”).
121. See Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 117, at 2. But see Erede, supra note 100, at 362, 382
(finding that hedge funds behave rather passively in Italy, and hypothesizing that this might entail
a conscious strategy aimed at obtaining “other, generally higher gains than those made possible by
following a genuinely activist strategy,” concealing “a form of ‘bad relational investing’ as a mean
to obtain higher gains”).
122. See Ringe, supra note 96, at 420 (noting that “as activists need to convince other funds that
their strategic plans are beneficial for the company as such (and do not create idiosyncratic
benefits for the hedge fund), this process mitigates the potential extraction of short-term private
benefits and ensures that activism is channeled into mutually beneficial activities”); Gilson &
Gordon, supra note 26, at 897–98. In regard to controlled companies see Belcredi & Enriques,
supra note 117, at 2 (providing “anecdotal evidence of activist initiatives aimed to curb the
extraction of private benefits by dominant shareholders”); Seretakis, supra note 120, at 451.
123. Kastiel, supra note 110, at 132. For a similar view, see Yu-Hsin Lin, Controlling
Controlling-Minority Shareholders: Corporate Governance and Leveraged Corporate Control,
2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 453, 454 (2017) (arguing that the participation of institutional
investors and shareholder activists is “essential to counteract the superpower of controllingminority shareholders and to govern their midstream opportunistic behaviors”). With a view to
promoting shareholder empowerment, criticism has targeted the tightening of European rules on
disclosure of major shareholdings at listed companies, which was brought about by the
Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 December 2004) on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending
Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 and its 2013 amendments. See Directive 2013/50/EU
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Directive
2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of transparency
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a
regulated market, Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and
Commission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down detailed rules for the implementation of certain
provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 13. Due to the Directive’s minimum
harmonisation approach, which does not prevent Member States from introducing, or leaving in
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Similarly, the rise of activist hedge fund board representation in the
United States and the UK amounts to a mechanism for creating a “market
for corporate quasi-control” in contexts of widely dispersed corporate
ownership. 124 While falling short of actual corporate control, a seat on the
board is associated with a degree of power that is indeed greater than mere
influence. 125 As a consequence, activists’ minority board representation
may provide a solution to the problem of shareholder-manager agency costs
and temper some of the most vocal criticisms of hedge fund activism, such
as excessive focus on the short-term and weak commitment to improving
operations and corporate strategies at targeted companies. 126
However, as is illustrated in greater detail below, skepticism regarding
positive views of activism, specifically in relation to de facto controlled
companies, does not appear to be misplaced when also considering the
potential corporate-governance consequences of successful activist
intervention.
III. THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN DE JURE AND DE
FACTO CONTROLLED COMPANIES
Despite the growing relevance of shareholder activism at controlled
companies and the increased attention paid to it by corporate governance
scholars and practitioners, existing analyses in this area feature a significant
limitation by not drawing a clearer dividing line between de jure and de
facto controlled companies. In the presence of some factual circumstances,
such distinction can substantively affect the corporate-governance
consequences of hedge fund engagement with de facto controlled
companies.
place, rules stricter than those dictated at the European level, a number of the Member States
chose to further restrict national rules disciplining the thresholds triggering disclosures, the
timeframe for notification, and the inclusion of some derivatives in the disclosure requirements.
See Seretakis, supra note 120, at 460–61. These measures have been criticized on the grounds of
their deterrent effect on activist engagements: as compared to the corresponding U.S. federal
regulations, which compel earlier disclosure in the process of building up consistent equity
positions at firms targeted by activists. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1
(2011) (requiring beneficial owners of more than 5% of voting class of registered company’s
equity to file within ten days a Schedule 13D reporting acquisition and other information such as
identity and background of acquirer and purpose of purchase). Therefore, the European rules have
been regarded as “fail[ing] to balance the costs imposed by hedge fund activists in terms of
compromising market transparency with the benefits of activism for shareholders and companies.”
Seretakis, supra note 120, at 463–65, 467 (highlighting that the overhaul of European disclosure
rules was not preceded by adequate policy analysis).
124. Anna L. Christie, The New Hedge Fund Activism: Activist Directors and the Market for
Corporate Quasi-Control, J. CORP. L. STUDIES 1, 3, 14 (2018) (illustrating that “[g]aining board
representation can be described as quasi-control rather than influence as even winning one seat on
a company board has enabled activists to make sweeping changes to companies, including
fundamental changes to corporate strategy and dismissal of the CEO or the CFO”).
125. Id. at 14 (referring to that category of influence in terms of “quasi-control”).
126. See id. at 40.
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Activist engagement is reported to involve U.S.-based controlled
companies both where the controlling shareholders hold 50% or more of the
voting rights—which in fact suggests that activists do not appear to focus
on “easier” targets—and where they hold less than 50% of the voting rights:
44% of the engagements examined in a recent article involved companies
where the controller’s ownership stake varied either between 30% and 40%
(29% of the sample) or between 40% and 50% (14%). 127 However, a closer
inquiry into any possible non-overlapping consequences that activism might
have for de jure and de facto controlled companies is needed. As corporate
control can come in different—both stronger and weaker—forms, it might
be useful to consider this de jure versus de facto distinction in regard to
activism at controlled companies.
Essentially, a distinction should be drawn depending upon whether or
not the controlling shareholder holds more than 50% of the voting rights
(irrespective of its share in cash flow rights). Where votes within a
company must be approved by a majority, de facto control can nonetheless
be established on the basis of a stake accounting for less than 50% of the
votes where this block secures control over voting outcomes due to the
particular circumstances, including shareholder composition and actual
voter turnout. 128 Although activism at controlled companies does not seem
to differ significantly in nature from that prevailing within widely held
corporations, 129 in situations of de facto control, the potential impact of
activist intervention on the company, and the effect on the balance of
interests surrounding it, can be much more far-reaching than in companies
under de jure control.
The recent case concerning Telecom Italia has clearly shown that,
where de facto controlled companies are involved and minority-

127. See Kastiel, supra note 110, at 87–88 (further finding that activist engagements with “fully
controlled” companies are almost as successful as those with companies whose controllers hold
only 30% to 40% of the voting rights).
128. See, e.g., Cheffins & Armour, supra note 3, at 58 n.37 (illustrating that corporate influence
differs from voting control in that “in a voting environment characterized by majority rule, an
influential, as opposed to controlling, stake will be one where the purchaser holds some proportion
α (where 0 < α < 1) of the voting rights, such that 0 < α < 0.5. With a firm with dispersed stock
ownership, it will typically be possible to control the outcome of a vote on most issues with a block
less than 50% of the votes. If we take n to represent the fraction of the voting rights necessary to
secure a majority vote with certainty (where 0 < n < 0.5), then we can add an additional constraint,
namely that 0 < α < n < 0.5”) (emphasis added).
129. Kastiel, supra note 110, at 85–88 (finding that contrary to possible expectations, activists
that engage with controlled companies: (i) do not primarily focus on governance changes, but also
target core business and financial matters (such as demands to divest assets, initiate a capital
restructuring, return cash via dividends or buybacks, review strategic alternatives, seek or block
mergers, etc.); (ii) do not use only low profile, collaborative strategies to achieve their goals, but
also employ aggressive, hostile strategies (such as a threatened or actual proxy contest or a
lawsuit); and (iii) do not pick “easier” targets (i.e. companies whose controllers hold between 30%
and 40% of the voting rights), but also target fully controlled companies).
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empowering devices apply, 130 activist engagement can bring about
substantial changes in the governance structure of the firm and even
terminate control, regardless of any change in the company’s ownership and
the voting rights attached. 131 As will be illustrated in more detail below, the
May 4, 2018 vote at the shareholders’ meeting of Telecom Italia proved to
be critical for the company’s de facto controlling shareholder, Vivendi SA,
a French media and communications group. 132 Thanks to slate voting and
voting support provided by both institutional investors and the Italian State,
the slate submitted by Elliott Management Corporation affiliates—which
collectively held a stake of only around 9%—won a majority (albeit
narrow) of the votes. 133
In keeping with Telecom Italia’s by-laws, Elliott thus won two-thirds of
the seats on the board of directors. 134 As a result, Vivendi’s control over
Telecom Italia ended, in spite of the fact that, with its nearly 24% stake,
Vivendi was still the major shareholder, retaining a relative majority of the
voting rights. 135 Such an outcome is obviously not even conceivable at de
jure controlled companies, where voting outcomes at the shareholders’
general meeting will obviously, and necessarily, coincide with the
controlling shareholder’s vote, irrespective of any diverging votes by
cohesive minorities.
The Telecom Italia case calls for an assessment of the possible
consequences of activist engagement at de facto controlled companies that
may arise out of the interplay between factual circumstances and regulatory
tools. On the one hand, the ownership composition of the targeted company
matters, as does the stance adopted by traditional institutional shareholders
in relation to voting. On the other hand, the legal definition of a controlling
shareholder needs to be considered, alongside the legal regime applicable to
controlled companies, as well as minority empowering regulatory devices
governing board elections, such as the Italian regime of slate voting at
director elections.

130. Specifically, board representation rights based on slate voting at director elections. See
supra note 114 and accompanying text.
131. See infra Part IV.
132. See infra Part IV.
133. See infra Part IV.
134. See Press Release, Telecom Italia, Tim Shareholders’ Meeting Held (May 4, 2018),
http://www.telecomitalia.com/content/dam/telecomitalia/en/archive/documents/investors/AGM_a
nd_Meetings/2018/CS_post_assemblea-ENG.pdf.
135. See infra note 157.
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IV. WHY ACTIVIST ENGAGEMENTS AT DE FACTO
CONTROLLED COMPANIES CAN BE DIFFERENT: THE
TELECOM ITALIA CASE
For a variety of reasons, the Telecom Italia case may certainly be a
peculiar one. However, the constellation of circumstances which triggered it
cannot be dismissed as unique, thus allowing the conclusion that its
outcome cannot possibly be replicated and should therefore be disregarded.
A closer consideration of the relevant facts will show which general
implications can be drawn from the case in terms of potential consequences
of activism at de facto controlled companies.
The events of May 4, 2018 briefly illustrated above were preceded by a
set of circumstances following Vivendi’s entry in Telecom Italia as part of a
wider strategic media-buying plan which included, amongst other things,
building an influential position within Mediaset, a major media and
broadcasting listed company. 136 Vivendi became Telecom Italia’s major
shareholder in 2014, following the conclusion of a share purchase
agreement with the Spanish Telefonica, and subsequently increased its
stake up to 24.9%—just below the 25% threshold triggering a mandatory
takeover bid under Italian law.137 At the December 2015 shareholders’
meeting, Vivendi gained four seats on the board of directors and
136. Following its stake building in Mediaset in 2016, due to the potential for de facto control
over multiple entities in the telecommunications and media sector threatening violation of EU
antitrust regulation and media pluralism, Vivendi was required by the Italian Communications
Authority (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni) to reduce its position in either Mediaset
or Telecom Italia. See Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Delibera 178/17/CONS
(Apr. 18, 2017), available in Italian at https://www.agcom.it/documentazione/documento?p
_p_auth=fLw7zRht&p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_ls3TZlzsK0hm&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_col_id=co
lumn-1&p_p_col_count=1&_101_INSTANCE_ls3TZlzsK0hm_struts_action=%2Fasset_
publisher%2Fview_content&_101_INSTANCE_ls3TZlzsK0hm_assetEntryId=7533934&_101_I
NSTANCE_ls3TZlzsK0hm_type=document. Vivendi chose to cap its voting rights at Mediaset
just below 10% by transferring the shares exceeding that threshold to a blind trust, and to retain
full voting rights at Telecom Italia. See Press Release, Autorità per le Garanzie nelle
Comunicazioni (Apr. 11, 2018), available in Italian at https://www.agcom.it/
documentazione/documento?p_p_auth=fLw7zRht&p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_ls3TZlzsK0hm&p_
p_lifecycle=0&p_p_col_id=column1&p_p_col_count=1&_101_INSTANCE_ls3TZlzsK0hm_struts_action=%2Fasset_publisher%2F
view_content&_101_INSTANCE_ls3TZlzsK0hm_assetEntryId=10238311&_101_INSTANCE_l
s3TZlzsK0hm_type=document.
137. See Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58, Art. 106 (It.) (Consolidated Law on
Finance), available in English at http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/laws-andregulations/documenti/english/laws/fr_decree58_1998.htm?hkeywords=&docid=0&page=0&hits
=20&nav=false (according to which “[a]nyone who, following acquisitions or increased voting
rights, holds a stake greater than the thirty percent threshold or holds more than thirty percent of
the voting rights of the same, promotes a takeover bid addressed to all security holders for the
totality of the securities admitted for trading on a regulated market in their possession,” and
further adding that “[i]n companies other than SMEs [(small-to-medium entities)], the offer
referred to in section 1 can be promoted also by anyone who, subsequent to acquisitions, comes to
hold a stake greater than the threshold of twenty-five per cent, where there is no other shareholder
with a higher stake”).
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successfully opposed a proposed conversion of non-voting shares into
voting shares, which would have significantly diluted existing shareholders’
voting rights. 138 This was followed by a change of Telecom’s CEO and, in
May 2017, by new board elections at which the slate of nominees submitted
by Vivendi secured a narrow majority of the votes cast (49.3% as against
49% obtained by the short slate of independent candidates submitted by
institutional investors through Assogestioni, the Italian asset managers’
association). 139 Vivendi hence secured two-thirds of the board seats for a
three-year term. 140 On account of the broader circumstances, and based on
the relevant definitions under Italian law and the International Financial
Reporting Standards, Vivendi was thus classified as Telecom Italia’s de
facto controlling shareholder, as was confirmed by Consob, the Italian
Supervisory Authority in September 2017, following an inquiry by the
company’s board of statutory auditors. 141
Against this background, in March 2018, Elliott built a stake close to
9% (8.85%) in Telecom Italia and submitted a proposal that six Vivendiaffiliated directors be removed and replaced with the new independent
directors proposed by Elliot, to be voted on at the annual general meeting
scheduled for April 24, 2018. 142 Next, on April 5, 2018, Treasury-owned

138. See Press Release, Telecom Italia, Telecom Italia Shareholders’ Meeting Held (Dec. 15,
2015),
https://www.telecomitalia.com/tit/en/archivio/media/comunicati-stampa/telecom-italia/
corporate/economico-finanziario/2015/shareholders-meeting-held-december-15-2015.html.
139. Assogestioni, the Italian Investment Managers Association, actually plays a key role in
selecting candidates and submitting minority slates. See Strampelli, supra note 115, at 134.
Strampelli’s article illustrating that,
the engagement strategy adopted by Assogestioni and the affiliated institutional
investors is very different from that usually adopted by activist hedge funds.
Assogestioni seeks to achieve “less confrontational engagement with the management
of portfolio companies,” and focuses almost exclusively on the election of directors
through the presentation of minority lists comprised of a list of candidates numbering
less than half of the positions to which appointments are to be made. This clearly shows
that the institutional investor engagement promoted by Assogestioni is primarily aimed
at minimizing “the agency costs arising from the presence of a controlling shareholder
by sharing management decisions, and thus by exercising closer monitoring,” and not—
in contrast to the usual approach of hedge funds—at forcing major changes in corporate
strategy or replacing management.
Id. at 135–36.
140. See Press Release, Telecom Italia, TIM Shareholders’ Meeting Held (May 4, 2017),
https://www.telecomitalia.com/tit/en/archivio/media/comunicati-stampa/telecomitalia/corporate/economico-finanziario/2017/PR-AGM-TIM-04-05-17.html.
141. Commissione nazionale per le società e la borsa (Consob), Decision No. 0106341 of Sept.
13, 2017, available in English at http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/otherregulatory-measures/documenti/english/resolutions/c0106341.htm.
142. See Press Release, Telecom Italia, TIM: Request to Supplement the Agenda for the
Shareholders’ Meeting (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.telecomitalia.com/tit/en/archivio/media
/comunicati-stampa/telecom-italia/corporate/economico-finanziario/2018/CS-IntegrazioneAssemblea-150318.html.
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Cassa Depositi e Prestiti announced that it would buy Telecom Italia shares
up to a maximum 5% stake. 143
In response to Elliott’s proposal, eight of the fifteen board members
resigned. 144 Under the terms of the by-laws, this resulted in the resignation
of the entire board, and thus required new board elections to be held. 145 The
board of directors decided by a majority to exclude Elliott’s March 2018
proposal from the agenda for the April 24th shareholder’s meeting,
considering it moot on account of the events that had subsequently
occurred. 146 The board’s decision was upheld by the courts, rejecting
objections alleged by the company’s board of auditors. 147 Thus, elections of
a full new board were on the agenda of a special shareholders’ meeting on
May 4, 2018. 148 Interestingly, the prominent proxy advisory firm,
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), considered the board’s decision to
challenge its own auditors in court to raise questions concerning the
independence of the board; ISS stated that Telecom Italia shareholders
should vote for Elliott’s slate even though this would grant Elliott control of
the board. 149
Vivendi and Elliott each submitted its own slate. 150 Non-activist
institutional investors (including many leading asset managers, like
BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, and Fidelity) did not, and the vast
143. See Press Release, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, CDP: il Cda delibera l’ingresso, con una
prospettiva di lungo periodo, nel capitale di Telecom Italia S.p.A. (TIM) (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.cdp.it/media/comunicati-stampa/cdp-il-cda-delibera-lingresso—con-una-prospettivadi-lungo-periodo—nel-capitale-di-telecom-italia-s-p-a—tim.kl.
144. See Press Release, Vivendi, Vivendi Representatives Resign from Telecom Italia’s Board
of Directors (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.vivendi.com/en/investment-analysts/pressreleases/vivendi-representatives-resign-from-telecom-italias-board-of-directors/.
145. See Press Release, Telecom Italia, Shareholders’ Meeting to Renew the Whole Board of
Directors Called for 4 May 2018 (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.telecomitalia.com
/tit/en/archivio/media/comunicati-stampa/telecom-italia/corporate/istituzionale/2018/PR-BoD220318.html.
146. Id.
147. See Press Release, Telecom Italia, TIM: Judge Suspends Effectiveness of the Board of
Statutory Auditors’ Resolution on Agenda for the AGM of April 24 (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.telecomitalia.com/tit/en/archivio/media/comunicati-stampa/telecomitalia/corporate/istituzionale/2018/TIM-appeal-230418.html; see also Press Release, Telecom
Italia, TIM Notifies Appeal Against Supplementation of the Agenda for the AGM on 24 April
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.telecomitalia.com/tit/en/archivio/media/comunicati-stampa/telecomitalia/corporate/economico-finanziario/2018/TIM-CS-Ricorso-130418.html.
148. See Press Release, Telcom Italia, supra note 145.
149. See Scott Deveau, ISS Urges Investor Support for Elliott’s Telecom Italia Nominees,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2018, 17:37 CEST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0416/iss-urges-investor-support-for-elliott-s-telecom-italia-nominees.
150. See Press Release, Vivendi, Vivendi Announces Board Candidates for Telecom Italia (Apr.
5, 2018), https://www.vivendi.com/en/investment-analysts/press-releases/62337/; see also Press
Release, Telecom Italia, TIM: Elliot International LP, Elliot Associates LP e The Liverpool
Limited Part[n]ership have filed the Slate for the Renewal of the Board of Directors (Apr. 10,
2018),
https://www.telecomitalia.com/tit/en/archivio/media/comunicati-stampa/telecom-italia/
corporate/economico-finanziario/2018/CS-LISTA-ELLIOT-CdA-Maggio-2018.html.
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majority of these chose instead to support Elliott’s candidates. 151 Vivendi’s
slate featured five independent directors out of ten, while all ten nominees
on Elliott’s slate were classified as independent. 152 Elliott also sought
support from fellow shareholders in an open letter dated April 26, 2018. 153
This letter criticized Telecom Italia’s conflicted governance structure on
account of Vivendi’s allegedly negative influence and self-serving
behavior, and illustrated the need to refresh and empower the board “to
correct the persistent undervaluation that is clearly present at [Telecom
Italia],” while affirming support of the company’s CEO and business
plan. 154
Eventually, with the backing of an impressive number of institutional
investors, and also of Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, which had actually bought
up a 4.78% stake by May 4th, Elliott’s slate received 49.84% of the votes
cast (equaling 33.47% of the share capital), as compared to Vivendi’s slate,
which garnered 47.17% of the votes (31.68% of the share capital). 155 As a
result, the new board was made up of all ten directors drawn from Elliott’s
slate, and five picked from Vivendi’s “minority” slate, including the former
CEO, whom the new board re-confirmed as chief executive. 156
Thus, power within the board shifted to activist-appointed independent
directors, with Vivendi unable to exercise control over Telecom Italia,
despite maintaining the largest stake (with 23.94% on May 4th) and a
corresponding share of the voting rights. 157

151. See The Minutes of the May 4, 2018 Shareholders’ Meeting (in Italian),
http://www.telecomitalia.com/tit/en/investors/shareholders/agm/assembly-4-05-2018.html;
see
also Sahil Mahtani, Telecom Italia Vote Shows How Activists and Passive Investors Can Work
Together, COLUM. L. SCH. BLOG ON CORP. & CAP. MARKETS (May 16, 2018),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/05/16/telecom-italia-vote-shows-how-activists-andpassive-investors-can-work-together.
152. See Press Release, Telecom Italia, Vivendi Has Filed the Slate for the Renewal of the
Board
of
Directors
(Apr.
5,
2018),
https://www.telecomitalia.com/
tit/en/archivio/media/comunicati-stampa/telecom-italia/corporate/economico-finanziario/2018/CSLISTA-VIVENDI-CdA-Maggio-2018.html; Press Release, Telecom Italia, supra note 150.
153. Letter from Elliot Advisors (UK), to Telecom Italia Shareholders Ahead of May 4th Vote,
BUS. WIRE (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180426006737/en/
Elliott-Advisors-UK-Limited-Statement-Telecom-Italia.
154. Id.
155. See the relevant documents concerning the May 4, 2018 Shareholders’ Meeting, including
the Minutes and a Summary Report of the Votes, http://www.telecomitalia.com/tit
/en/investors/shareholders/agm/assembly-4-05-2018.html.
156. See Press Release, Telecom Italia, Fulvio Conti Appointed Chair, Amos Genish Chief
Executive Officer (May 7, 2018), https://www.telecomitalia.com/tit/en/archivio/media/
comunicati-stampa/telecom-italia/corporate/istituzionale/2018/PR-TIM-BoD-070518.html;
see
also Press Release, Telecom Italia, TIM Shareholders’ Meeting Held (May 4, 2018),
https://www.telecomitalia.com/content/dam/telecomitalia/en/archive/documents/media/Press_rele
ases/telecom_italia/Corporate/Institutional/2018/PR-TIM-Shareholders-meeting-040518-EN.pdf.
157. See Press Release, Telecom Italia, TIM: Vivendi’s Direction and Coordination Ceases
(May 16, 2018), https://www.telecomitalia.com/tit/en/archivio/media/comunicati-stampa/telecomitalia/corporate/istituzionale/2018/PR-BoD-Governance-160518.html.
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Drawing upon this factual background, a number of points make the
Telecom Italia case an interesting one in respect of the general issue of
activism at de facto controlled companies. First, the case clearly shows how
enhanced minority-shareholder rights and their interplay with the
composition of the shareholder base can facilitate activist intervention,
mobilize mainstream institutional investors’ “receptive” stewardship, and
ultimately favor successful—and indeed even disruptive—activist
campaigns at de facto controlled companies.158 The role played by the
Italian State in the Telecom Italia case should not be overstated, even
leaving aside considerations of national interest. Of course, had Cassa
Depositi e Prestiti not taken on an almost 5% equity stake in Telecom Italia
and voted in support of the activist’s proposal, Elliott’s slate might not have
garnered a majority of the votes cast; however, the outcome might well
have been the same had, all else remaining equal, a significant number of
independent shareholders not decided to cooperate and to vote in support of
Elliott’s slate. 159 At the same time, the case shows the significance of the
changes to corporate governance within contexts of concentrated ownership
in recent years, specifically in the form of “increased shareholder
participation and voting as foreign institutional investors have challenged
the market norm of letting large (but not necessarily controlling)
shareholders hold sway.” 160
Second, and more interestingly, the case teaches that at de facto
controlled companies—by leveraging on public investors’ voting support
and submitting long slates of director nominees 161—an activist can win a
majority of the seats on the board of directors and hence potentially gain
substantial influence over the firm’s management for the duration of the
board members’ term in office without having to gain a majority equity
stake in terms of the cash flow rights. At the same time, the loss of control
over the board by the former controlling shareholder as a consequence of
activist intervention entails a loss of its control over the company, even if
that shareholder’s stake remained the same as it was before as the largest

158. See supra notes 118–119, 155 and accompanying text.
159. See Mahtani, supra note 151.
160. Federica Soro, Glass, Lewis & Co., Shareholder Battles at Telecom Italia, HARV. L. SCH.

F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 8, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2018/06/08/shareholder-battles-at-telecom-italia/.
161. Interestingly, the frequency of long-slate campaigns conducted globally—in which an
activist seeks to replace at least 50% of the board—spiked in the first half of 2018. See LAZARD,
supra note 15, at 7 (reporting that long-slate campaigns accounted for one-third of all board
nomination campaigns in the first half of 2018, the highest level since 2014, and explaining that
“the prevalence of long-slate campaigns is notable because they often portend actual or effective
changes in control[;] [i]n 53% of long-slate nomination campaigns, the result was an activist
winning the proxy fight, settling for more than 50% board change or the company ultimately
selling itself[;] [b]y contrast, such change in control outcomes resulted from only 16% of shortslate campaigns”).
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shareholder in the company: which, inter alia, entails the application of a
less stringent regime governing material related-party transactions. 162
V. DE FACTO CORPORATE CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES
It is important to analyze possible unexpected (and, perhaps, surprising)
effects of activist engagement at de facto controlled companies, such as
those which occurred at Telecom Italia, not only in relation to Europe,
where large blockholders who rank close to de facto control are not unusual
and enhanced minority shareholder rights are well established under
Member State laws. 163 Given that U.S.-based controlled companies are also
targeted by activists, the issue seems to be of interest for the United States
context as well. Moreover, it is of particular interest considering that U.S.
literature supports the adoption of minority-empowerment tools for director
elections featuring similarities with the Italian slate voting regime as an
effective way of making controlling shareholders more accountable to other
public shareholders by creating an effective platform for activist
involvement and enhancing board independence when dealing with
conflicted decisions. 164
162. According to Article 8 of Consob Regulation No. 17221 of 12 March 2010 on transactions
with related parties, the board may approve material related party transactions (transactions “of
greater importance,” as identified through a set of quantitative parameters) only if favorable
advice has been previously given by a committee of independent directors involved in the
negotiations; however, company-specific related party procedures may stipulate that the board
may approve the transaction despite the negative opinion from the committee if, and only if, a
shareholders’ meeting is convened and a majority of unrelated shareholders approve the
transaction (the so-called whitewash). Art. 8, Consob. Reg. No. 17221/2010,
http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/laws-andregulations/documenti/english/laws/reg17221e.htm?hkeywords=&docid=12&page=0&hits=24&n
av=false). Instead, transactions “of lesser importance” may be approved by the board
notwithstanding the negative opinion of the committee, who, in addition, is not required to lead
the negotiations, and without recourse to the shareholders’ meeting whitewash. See Art. 7,
Consob. Reg. No. 17221/2010, http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/laws-andregulations/documenti/english/laws/reg17221e.htm?hkeywords=&docid=12&page=0&hits=24&n
av=false. According to Annex 1 of Consob Regulation No. 17221 (concerning definitions
functional to the definitions of related parties and related party transactions), an entity is a related
party to a company if, among others, the party “controls the company, is controlled by, or is under
common control[.]” See Annex 1, Consob. Reg. No. 17221/2010, http://www.consob.it/
web/consob-and-its-activities/laws-andregulations/documenti/english/laws/reg17221e.htm?hkeywords=&docid=12&page=0&hits=24&n
av=false (emphasis added). Therefore, losing control over Telecom Italia means that the regime on
related parties will no longer apply to further Vivendi-controlled entities. On the Italian regime for
related-party transactions see Strampelli, supra note 115, at 144–45.
163. As noted earlier, since activist engagements are found to largely depend on shareholder
rights protection, this factor, coupled with the frequency of large, de facto dominating
stockholders, arguably enhances the probabilities of surprising outcomes of shareholder
empowerment in Europe. See Katelouzou, supra note 118, at 853.
164. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 109, at 1315 (arguing that in order “[t]o make
independent directors more effective in overseeing conflicted decisions, . . . public investors
should have the power to influence the election or retention of some ‘enhanced-independence’
directors [playing] a key role in vetting conflicted decisions, [while not being empowered] to
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In addition, recent Delaware decisions seem to show a willingness to
“cast a gimlet eye” on the special and unique circumstances that, from case
to case, lead a shareholder with a relatively low ownership stake to end up
as a controlling shareholder. 165 The recent Tesla Motors case is particularly
illustrative in this respect. 166 Certain transactions involving influential
stockholders are thus subject to entire fairness review, unless they are
approved in advance by both an independent committee and endorsed by an
informed and uncoerced vote by a majority of the minority shareholders. 167
Indeed, where corporate control exists, a wide array of functional rules
apply in virtually all jurisdictions, each body of rules serving the specific
purpose of its own particular regulatory framework. Corporate control is
relevant, e.g., under capital markets law, accounting law, competition law,
as well as company law. While a consideration of all of the many regulatory
implications of corporate control falls beyond the scope of this Article, it is
important to highlight how corporate control affects corporate governance.
Although with different intensity, in situations involving corporate
control, U.S. federal securities regulations and Delaware law (the most
significant jurisdiction for corporate-law purposes) require, amongst further
aspects, ex post disclosure of material transactions concluded between the
company and the controlling stockholder, and ex ante heightened
procedural safeguards, which must be applied to such transactions in order
for the business judgment defense to be applicable. 168 Since related party
transactions involve an agency problem, those safeguards are intended to
protect the company and its non-controlling shareholders against potential

prevent the controller or their fellow directors from making other corporate decisions”)]; see also
Kastiel, supra note 110, at 132 (urging regulators and institutional investors to require controlled
issuers to grant shareholders unaffiliated with the controllers the right to elect minority directors).
165. Ann Lipton, Tesla Case Reveals the Poverty of Our Definition of a Controlling
Stockholder, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2018), http://lawprofessors.typepad.
com/business_law/2018/03/tesla-case-reveals-the-poverty-of-our-definition-of-a-controllingstockholder.html.
166. See generally In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., Consolidated C.A. Mo. 12711-VCS,
2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 102, 102 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (finding Tesla’s 22.1% shareholder and
chairman of the board to be a controlling stockholder based on “the chairman’s voting influence,
his domination of the board during the process leading up to the acquisition against the backdrop
of his extraordinary influence within the company generally, board level conflicts that diminished
the board’s resistance to his influence, and the company’s and the chairman’s own
acknowledgements of his outsized influence”).
167. Entire fairness is the highest standard of review in corporate law, which applies where a
majority of the directors approving the transaction are self-interested or where a majority
stockholder stands on both sides of the transaction or receives different consideration from the
transaction than the other stockholders. The entire fairness standard requires the board to
demonstrate that the transaction is entirely fair to the stockholders as to both process (fair dealing)
and substance (fair price). See infra notes 200–205 and accompanying text.
168. See Geeyoung Min, The SEC and the Courts’ Cooperative Policing of Related Party
Transactions, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 663, 667–68 (2014).
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value diversion or misappropriation by controlling shareholders. 169 For
these protective mechanisms to apply, corporate control is obviously
assumed as a precondition, since it is regarded as a source for potential
abuse or exploitation. Hence, protective devices only apply as long as
corporate control—whether de jure or de facto—is in place.
Against this backdrop and focusing on corporate governance effects of
corporate control, in order to establish the extent to which activism may
affect de facto controlled companies, it is necessary to consider the legal
definition of a de facto controlling stockholder and the consequences of
corporate control vis-à-vis the rules applicable to related-party transactions.
In the United States, corporate control is covered both by a set of rules
dealing with related party transactions and also by common law. 170
Depending on whether they kick in after or before the transaction takes
place, regulations dealing with related party transactions are basically
categorized into two groups. 171 The first group of regulations focuses on ex
post monitoring and oversight over related party transactions. 172
Specifically, SEC regulation S-K Item 404(a) requires the disclosure (in the
company’s annual filings and its proxy statements) of any transaction that
has occurred since the beginning of the company’s last fiscal year, or that is
currently proposed, between the company and any 5% shareholder where
the amount involved exceeds $120,000 and the 5% shareholder has a direct
or indirect material interest in the transaction. 173 In addition, in order to
provide users of financial statements with adequate information concerning
related party transactions, PCAOB Auditing Standard 2410, which is
applicable to SEC registrant audits, requires the auditor “to test the accuracy
and completeness” of information relating to related party transactions. 174
The disclosure of related party transactions is in fact required by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Accounting Standards
Codification (ASC) Topic 850. 175
The second group of regulations (ex ante regulations) require certain
procedures to be put in place for the prior screening of related party
transactions. 176 At the federal level, SEC Regulation S-K Item 404(b)
169. See Luca Enriques, Gerard Hertig, Hideki Kanda & Mariana Pargendler, Related-Party
Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 145 (R. Kraakman et al. eds., 2017).
170. In fact, controlling shareholders fall under the relevant definition of a related party, which,
according to Instruction 1(b)(i) to Item 404(a) of SEC Regulation S-K, also includes 5%
shareholders. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) (2011).
171. See Min, supra note 168, at 676–80 (referring to transactions between the company and its
directors).
172. Id. at 677.
173. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) (2014).
174. AUDITING STANDARDS, AS 2410: Related Parties, § 14 (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd. 2017).
175. See JOANNE M. FLOOD, WILEY GAAP 2017: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 1200 (2017); Min, supra note 168, at 677.
176. See Min, supra note 168, at 677.
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requires public companies to disclose their policies and procedures for the
review, approval or ratification of related party transactions. 177 In addition,
major stock exchanges require related party transactions to be reviewed and
evaluated for potential conflicts of interest by an appropriate body within
the company involved, such as the audit committee or another comparable
body. 178
Aside from federal law, in contrast to transactions between the
company and its directors and officers, Delaware’s corporate statute does
not provide a safe harbor provision setting out pre-conditions to address
conflicts of interest affecting transactions between the company and its
controlling shareholders. 179 However, the common law duty of loyalty
applies to transactions involving a controlling shareholder. 180 As a matter of
fact, related party transactions are most often subjected to formal check
during litigation, where the courts review any transactions involving the
controlling shareholder’s alleged breach of its duty of loyalty. 181 Therefore,
defining whether or not a shareholder (or a coalition of shareholders) should
be regarded as a controlling shareholder becomes paramount, particularly in
cases other than the (much simpler) case of de jure control.
As has been noted by Justice Holland, there is no fixed meaning for the
term “control” under Delaware law: “[i]ts definition varies according to the
context in which it is being considered, e.g., fiduciary responsibility, tort
liability, filing consolidated tax returns, sale of control.” 182 Within the
context of the imposition of fiduciary liabilities upon the controlling
shareholder in relation to particular transactions with the corporation, the
distinction between de jure and de facto corporate control is well
established from a theoretical standpoint. 183 A shareholder with less than
50% of the voting rights may nonetheless qualify as a (de facto) controlling

177. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(b) (2011).
178. See NYSE Listed Company Manual 314.00; Nasdaq Rule 5630 (a very similar standard).

Under certain conditions, exchanges also require “shareholder approval prior to the issuance of
common stock, or of securities convertible into or exercisable for common stock, in any
transaction” related to substantial security holders of the company. NYSE Listed Company
Manual 312.03; see also Nasdaq Rule 5635.
179. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 144 (a)(1)–(3) (2018) (offsetting voidability of conflicted
transactions between the company and its directors or officers where the transaction satisfies
certain disclosure requirements, is approved by disinterested directors or shareholders, and is fair
to all shareholders).
180. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board
Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541, 545 (2010).
181. See Min, supra note 168, at 679.
182. Weinstein Enters. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 507 (Del. 2005).
183. See Jonathan Rosenberg & Alexandra Lewis-Reisen, Controlling-Shareholder RelatedParty Transactions Under Delaware Law, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG
1 (Aug. 30, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/30/controlling-shareholder-relatedparty-transactions-under-delaware-law/.
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shareholder where, depending on the facts and circumstances, he has, and
actually “exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.” 184
Whether a minority blockholder exercises control over the company’s
business affairs is, however, a strongly factual issue because “there is no
absolute percentage of voting power that is required in order for there to be
a finding that a controlling stockholder exists.”185 Therefore, “the analysis
of whether a controlling shareholder exists must take into account whether
the stockholder, as a practical matter, possesses a combination of stock
voting power and managerial authority that enables him to control the
corporation, if he so wishes.” 186
A range of factors are considered to determine whether—despite the
gap between the shareholder’s ownership stake and a voting majority—it is
reasonably conceivable that the minority shareholder actually dominates
and controls the corporation, its board or the deciding committee, whether
generally or with respect to a specific transaction, or both. 187 In order to
show that the minority stockholder “[has] such formidable voting and
managerial power that [he], as a practical matter, [is] no differently situated
than if [he] had majority voting control,” 188 relevant circumstances typically
include the power—also stemming from sources extraneous to stock
ownership—to influence a contested election, or a stockholder vote, to
bring about significant changes at the company, including the removal of
board members, or the inability of the company to take action without the
stockholder’s consent. 189 The controller may directly dominate the board’s
process through his actual presence in the boardroom, or his presence may
“be more of a ‘looming’ nature manifested by the board’s awareness of his
ability to make changes at the board level or to push other coercive levers
should he be displeased with the board’s performance or decision

184. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del. 1994) (emphasis in
original); see also Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 429–30 (Del. 1997); In re KKR Fin.
Holdings LLC S’holders Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 993–94 (Del. Ch. 2014); In re Zhongpin, Inc.
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 7393-VCN, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 252, at *18–19 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26,
2014).
185. In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., 2006 Del Ch. LEXIS 158, at *32 (Del. Ch. Aug.
18, 2006).
186. In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 553 (Del. Ch. 2003).
187. In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., Consolidated C.A. Mo. 12711-VCS, 2018 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 102, at *32 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (citing In re Rouse Props., Inc. Fiduciary Litig.,
2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 93, at *28–29 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018)).
188. In re PNB Holding, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at *31; In re Morton’s Restaurant Grp. Inc.
S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 665 (Del. Ch. 2013).
189. In re Tesla Motors, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 102, at *33; Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC,
125 A.3d 304, 307 n.7 (Del. 2015) (citing In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 101 A.3d at 991–95); see
also In re Crimson Exploration Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 8541-VCP, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS
213, at *32–39 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014) (presenting a list of significant cases examining whether a
minority stockholder satisfied the actual control test, and highlighting “the importance and factintensive nature of the actual control factor”).
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making.” 190 One way or another, the stockholder’s power must be “so
potent that independent directors and minority stockholders cannot freely
exercise their judgment, fearing retribution from the controlling minority
blockholder.” 191 As a matter of fact, a “director [might be] sufficiently loyal
to, beholden to, or otherwise influenced by an interested party to undermine
the director’s ability to judge the matter on its merits.” 192 Therefore, the
significant contextual factors indicative of de facto controlling shareholder
status often include the shareholder being chairman of the board and chief
executive officer and having “managerial clout” over the company’s
managers and/or fellow board members, whether as a consequence of
family or personal relationships and business connections, 193 the lack of
substantial independence of a majority of directors, 194 or the stockholder’s
factual ability to dominate the corporate decision-making process. 195 Public
statements made by the stockholder or the company regarding the extent of
the stockholder’s influence are also meaningful for informing the decision
whether such stockholder should be regarded as a controlling
shareholder. 196 Interestingly, a tendency within the courts of Delaware “to
cast a gimlet eye on the webs of social and business relationships . . . that
often tie boards together . . . [which] may not only evince a lack of
independence, but may even count toward controlling shareholder status . . .
.” 197 Cases like Oracle and Tesla seem to show that the willingness to
leverage indicia, in addition to and other than stock ownership, might
render the Delaware courts more inclined to “aggressively” find that a

190. In re Rouse Props., Inc. Fiduciary Litig., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 93, at *29 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9,
2018)
191. In re PNB Holding, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at *30 (citing In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d
421, 443–45 (Del. Ch. 2002)).
192. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92, at
*47 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
193. In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 552–53 (Del. Ch. 2003).
194. N.J. Carpenters Pension Fund v. Infogroup Inc., C.A. No. 5334-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 147, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011).
195. In re Crimson Exploration Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 8541-VCP, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS
213, at *38 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014) (summarizing that “a large blockholder will not be considered
a controlling shareholder unless they actually control the board’s decisions about the challenged
transaction”).
196. See In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., Consolidated C.A. Mo. 12711-VCS, 2018 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 102, at *44–45 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (relying on Tesla’s prior SEC filings and
further public statements by Tesla and Elon Musk, the company’s chairman, CEO and owner of a
22.1% stake, in considering Musk’s status as a controlling stockholder).
197. Gail Weinstein, Robert C. Schwenkel & Steven J. Steinman, Controlling Shareholder
Transactions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/26/controlling-shareholder-transactions/; see also Lipton,
supra note 165.
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stockholder with a relatively low ownership stake (at the level of 22% in
Tesla) is a controlling shareholder. 198
The presence of a controller is an important factor in enforcing
fiduciary obligations and achieving redress in the event that a controlling
shareholder abuses his power. Controlling shareholders owe fiduciary
duties to minority shareholders, which are similar to the duties of
directors. 199 According to the fiduciary duties doctrine, transactions
between a de facto controlling shareholder and the company are subject—
just as are those involving a de jure controlling shareholder—to ex post
judicial scrutiny according to the entire fairness standard of review, and not
to the less stringent business judgment rule. 200 Cases of self-dealing most
often concern the controlling stockholder’s duty of loyalty, which,
essentially, “mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its
shareholders takes precedence over any interest possessed by a director,
officer or controlling shareholder and not shared by the stockholders
generally.” 201 An action based on a breach of the duty of loyalty will
therefore require an assessment as to whether the terms of the selfinterested transaction concerned were dictated by the controlling
shareholder, and whether there is any special benefit for the controlling
stockholder that the minority stockholders do not share. 202 In fact, under the
entire fairness standard of review, both procedural fairness and financial
fairness are relevant. 203 As has been illustrated in the context of parentsubsidiary mergers,
[t]he concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.
The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it
was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to directors, and how the
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter
aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of
the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value,

198. See In re Crimson Exploration, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 213, at *37 n.68 (reporting that thenChancellor Strine acknowledged that the Court had made its perhaps “most aggressive” finding in
the Cysive opinion, where a 35% stockholder was considered to be a controller).
199. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1971); Kahn v. Lynch
Commc’n Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del. 1994).
200. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987); Lynch,
638 A.2d at 1115–16; Kahn v. Tremont, 694 A.2d 422, 428–29 (Del. 1997); see also Corwin v.
KKR Fin. Holdings, 125 A.3d 304, 305 (Del. 2015) (illustrating that the business judgment rule is
the appropriate standard of review for a fiduciary-duty action based on disinterested stockholder
approval of a transaction with a party other than a controlling stockholder) (emphasis added).
201. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92, at
*63 n.283 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361
(Del. 1993)).
202. Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 720–22; Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 27, 1984), 575 A.2d 1131, 1146 (Del. 1990).
203. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1115.
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earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic
or inherent value of a company’s stock. 204

While it falls to the plaintiff challenging the transaction to provide some
justification for invoking the fairness obligation, it is ultimately for the
controlling shareholder to prove the entire fairness of the transaction—and
thus compliance with fiduciary duties towards the company and other
shareholders. 205 However, where particular protective procedural devices
that mimic arm’s length transactions have been adopted, the burden of
demonstrating that the transaction was unfair to the minority entirely shifts
to the plaintiff. 206 Specifically, under the Lynch line of doctrine, either the
approval of the transaction by a well-functioning committee of independent
directors or an informed vote by a majority of the minority shareholders
will enable the burden of proof as regards the issue of entire fairness to be
shifted from the controlling shareholder to the plaintiff.207
Importantly, a novel exception as regards the applicable standard of
review was recently adopted in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp. 208 The
Delaware Supreme Court held that the business judgment presumption
revives where a dual-approval prerequisite is met. 209 In order to satisfy the
M & F Worldwide prerequisites, the transaction must be conditional from
the outset on both independent-director negotiation and approval, and on
informed and uncoerced approval of a majority of shareholders unaffiliated
with the controlling shareholder. 210 More specifically, under M & F
Worldwide, the business judgment standard applies to controller
transactions:
if, and only if: (i) the controller conditions the procession of the
transaction on the approval of both a Special Committee and a majority of
the minority stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is independent; (iii)
the Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and
to say no definitively; (iv) the Special Committee meets its duty of care in
negotiating a fair price; (v) the vote of the minority is informed; and (vi)
there is no coercion of the minority. 211

204. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
205. Id. at 710; Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
206. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 (referred to a parent-subsidiary merger “approved by an

informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders”).
207. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117.
208. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide, 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
209. Id. at 644.
210. Id. at 642; see also In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d 421, 435 n.16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2002); Olenik
v. Lodzinski, C.A. No. 2017-0414-JRS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 246, at *36 (Del. Ch. July 20, 2018)
(explaining that the ab initio requirement is to ensure that the deal structure truly “mimic[s] armslength dealing, and to neutralize the controller’s influence”).
211. M & F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 645 (emphasis in original); see also In re Zhongpin, C.A.
No. 7393-VCN, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 252, at *28 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2014).
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Where only one of these dual procedural protections is employed, or
any or all of the six conditions enumerated above are not met, the controller
will only receive burden-shifting within the framework of the entire fairness
standard of review, in keeping with the Lynch line of doctrine. 212
Of course, each of the protections required under M & F Worldwide
needs to be effective for the business judgment standard to apply. 213 This is
why the majority-of-the-minority stockholder vote must be a fully informed
and uncoerced one, and the special committee must “function in a manner
which indicates that the controlling stockholder did not dictate the terms of
the transaction and that the committee exercised real bargaining power ‘at
arm’s length.’” 214
Although established within the context of mergers, the M & F
Worldwide dual-approval framework should arguably apply to non-merger
controlling shareholder transactions as well. Such an extension would
appear to be consistent with previous evolution of Delaware law, given that
the “Delaware courts expanded the [] Lynch entire-fairness test from merger
cases to other controlling-shareholder transactions, with Chancellor Allen
stating that there is ‘no plausible rationale for a distinction between mergers
and other corporate transactions.’” 215
By and large, Delaware jurisprudence shows that there is no certainty as
regards the adoption of a process by which the courts can be prevented from
classifying a minority stockholder as a de facto controlling shareholder, and
hence disable entire fairness review.216 While the Tesla decision may be
less surprising as regards the court’s refusal to dismiss, given that the board
engaged in “no formal process” (such as forming a special committee when
deciding on the controller’s proposal to acquire a company that he
controlled at an allegedly unfairly high price), it is nonetheless instructive
with regard to the circumstances that were taken into account in support of
the conclusion that Elon Musk’s status was that of a controlling
shareholder. 217 Even where there are some procedural safeguards within the
board process, it is far from predictable whether entire fairness review will
212. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d at 646.
213. Id. at 645–46 (“If, after discovery, triable issues of fact remain about whether either or

both of the dual procedural protections were established, or if established were effective, the case
will proceed to a trial on which the court will conduct an entire fairness review.”) (emphasis
added).
214. Id. (citing Kahn v. Tremont, 694 A.2d 422, 429 (Del. 1997)).
215. Rosenberg & Lewis-Reisen, supra note 183, at 10 (further explaining that “[s]ince then,
the Lynch entire-fairness standard has been applied to controlling-shareholders’ managementservices agreements, loans, non-competition payments, and third-party ‘brokering’ payments”).
See, e.g., In re Ezcorp. Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9962-VCL, 2016
Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at *33 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (ruling that the entire fairness standard of
review applied to the challenged consultant agreements which involved self-dealing by a
controlling shareholder).
216. See Weinstein et al., supra note 197.
217. See supra notes 166, 187, 189, 196, 198 and accompanying text.
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actually be disabled. In point of fact—as happened in Oracle—the court
may well find the controller’s “outsized influence” over the company to be
so potent as a matter of fact as to allow the conclusion that a majority of the
board, and of the special committee charged with negotiations, is not
independent. 218 Hence, the most effective way of avoiding the entire
fairness review is, arguably, to meet the M & F Worldwide dual-approval
procedural devices. However, this would essentially require the controller
to relinquish control voluntarily and “give up his voting power by agreeing
to a non-waivable majority-of-the-minority condition,” 219 to ensure that the
process of negotiation and approval replicates a third-party transaction as
far as possible. When considered from the perspective of an activist, the
ability of minority shareholders to veto certain transactions as a
consequence of compliance with the requirements of M & F Worldwide can
be viewed as a pathway for activism in controlled companies. As has been
noted, within the context of M&A transactions,
[e]ven if most minority shareholders lack the ability to gather information
and closely analyze the suggested deal terms, the use of a legal rule that
incentivizes controllers to provide minority holders with veto power over
conflicted transactions allows activist shareholders to extract a higher
premium in going-private transactions (usually suspected to be conducted
at a depressed price) to the benefit of all shareholders. 220

VI. ASSESSING THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EFFECTS OF
THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE INFLUENCE AT DE
FACTO CONTROLLED COMPANIES
As has been shown above, the market for corporate influence 221 at de
facto controlled companies, or at any rate, at companies actually dominated
by a large influential stockholder, can sometimes be so powerful as to result
in a situation whereby the majority of seats on the board shifts from
directors appointed by the controlling shareholder to activist-appointed
directors, without any change in corporate ownership. Such an outcome
may result from the concurrence of a variety of complementary conditions,
including specifically: (i) the presence of a de facto dominant shareholder
holding a relatively low equity stake—granting even less than, say, 25% of
the voting rights, depending on the circumstances; (ii) a significant level of
218. In re Oracle Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92, at *58
(Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) (concluding that Oracle co-founder and 28% stockholder Lawrence
Ellison’s influence over board members was such as to result in “a majority of the Oracle board—
including two out of three members of the Special Committee that approved the acquisition—
lack[ed] independence”).
219. See M & F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 638, 642 (citing Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638
A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994)).
220. Kastiel, supra note 110, at 100 (emphasis in original).
221. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 3, at 59.
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institutional investors in the ownership of the company; (iii) the
applicability of legal rules that encourage influence-based activist
strategies—specifically, minority shareholders’ board representation rights;
and (iv) the ability of an activist’s proposals to attract sufficient voting
support, in particular from larger institutional fellow shareholders,
rendering it likely that the dominant shareholder’s voting power may be
overwhelmed as a consequence of the inherent possibility of disputing de
facto control. 222 The latter condition builds on the teaming up
phenomenon 223—the factual convergence of mainstream institutional
investors’ votes in support of activists’ proposals—as a lever for successful
activist intervention: in fact, this phenomenon “seems to be developing into
a broader market trend.” 224 Importantly, teaming up is a phenomenon to be
kept distinct from that of a shareholder coalition based on voting
agreements that grant the coalition collectively a substantive, and durable,
voting power which may even grant control over the company. The
distinctive feature of teaming up is precisely that, being a form of soft, nonorganized shareholder collaboration, voting convergence is spontaneous,
and occasional, since it does not rest upon any agreement entered into by
the shareholders.
It is questionable whether the market for corporate influence is efficient
at de facto controlled companies in terms of its corporate-governance
effects. All other things being equal, the particular ownership structure of
the target company—whether widely held, de jure controlled or de facto
controlled—might not plausibly be expected to be a neutral factor as
regards the efficiency of the corporate-governance structure brought about
following successful activist intervention. An outcome such as that in the
Telecom Italia case is at odds with the roles ordinarily played by, and the
usual balance of powers between, majority and minority shareholders, with
unexpected corporate-governance effects.
In order to assess the potential corporate-governance effects of activism
against the particular background of the company’s ownership structure, a
helpful starting point may be to draw a distinction between de jure and de
facto corporate control as regards the intensity of a controller’s
opportunistic incentives and the relationship of these incentives with board
representation rights granted to minorities.
In general terms, it may be argued that board representation achieved as
a consequence of successful activist initiatives enhances oversight of any
incentives on the part of the controller to extract private benefits, and helps
to reduce potential value diversion to the benefit of the controlling

222. See supra Part IV.
223. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 26, at 897–98.
224. Ringe, supra note 96, at 419.
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shareholder. 225 Compared to de jure controlled companies, board
representation at de facto controlled companies is theoretically an even
more potent tool for curbing controller opportunism because the controller’s
exposure to private incentives is higher. 226 Even under a one-share-one-vote
regime, de facto control can be based on a relatively small equity stake, as
may be the case where the largest shareholder is surrounded by a number of
very-small fellow shareholders who are either passive or unlikely to form a
coalition with the potential to overwhelm the controller’s voting power. In
the resulting concentrated-ownership structure, it is unlikely that cash-flow
rights and control rights will be bundled together tightly enough to align the
controller’s interests adequately with those of other investors, and thus
moderate the control agency cost.227 De facto controlling shareholders are
exposed to a greater incentive to extract private benefits than de jure
controlling shareholders: the smaller the controller’s equity stake and cash
flow rights, “the more she can divert from others—and thus the higher her
incentive to divert.” 228
This would theoretically suggest that—especially at de facto controlled
companies—minority shareholders should be granted protection through
regulatory devices allowing them to appoint some directors to the board to
render insiders more accountable.
However, under certain conditions, the exercise of such minority rights
may lever the contestability of de facto control and bring about outcomes
which can most probably be regarded as unintended—or, at least,
unexpected—consequences of the grant to minority shareholders of the
right to have a voice in board elections. Similar outcomes can render the
corporate governance structure even less efficient than in situations
involving de facto control.
The market for influence usually leads an activist to secure one or more
seats on the board, while maintaining its status as a minority. 229 Minority
board representation challenges entrenched boards or the controlling
shareholder. It “can often lead to the replacement of significant corporate
225. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1947 (1996) (promoting minority shareholder representation on the board
based on mandatory cumulative voting as a means by which to render it likely “that a minority of
directors is truly independent of management and . . . that these directors will owe affirmative
loyalty to the shareholders who elect them”).
226. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125
YALE L.J. 560, 591 (2016) (“The higher the controller’s share of cash-flow rights, the lower her
incentive to expropriate the minority.”).
227. Id. at 592–94 (2016) (arguing that the concentrated-ownership structure actually provides a
middle-ground solution to management agency costs, as compared to dispersed-ownership and
dual-class structures).
228. Id. at 591 n.103 (explaining that assuming equity is issued at a ratio of one share to one
vote, due to the interplay between control rights and cash flow rights, a relevant shareholder’s
incentive to expropriate the minority also depends on the degree of ownership concentration).
229. See, e.g., Edelman et al., supra note 26, at 1411.
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managers such as the CEO or CFO.” 230 Moreover, minority board
representation can improve self-dealing oversight, particularly in situations
where ex ante independent scrutiny of related-party transactions is
required, 231 or incentivized, 232 by the law in order to ensure that the
transaction is fair for the company and all of its shareholders. For example,
within Italian listed companies, the presence of a minority director
appointed by institutional investors based on mandatory slate voting has
had a positive impact on the strength of internal procedures for addressing
related-party transactions. 233 In particular, “the presence of at least one
minority director is indeed associated with adoption of stricter internal
codes, not only when minority directors are members of the committee of
independent directors vetting internal codes, but also when they merely sit
in the board.” 234 Indeed, the very reason why mandatory slate voting was
originally adopted in Italy for board elections at listed companies was to
secure minority board representation as a monitoring tool deployed by
active shareholders, in keeping with the view—that has grown predominant
at the European level—that institutional investors should be encouraged to
act as corporate stewards. 235 Further findings from the Italian context seem
230. Christie, supra note 124, at 3.
231. At the European level, SRD II ended up adopting a non-prescriptive stance regarding the

process to be adopted in relation to related-party transactions. Article 9(c)(4) vests the Member
States with broad discretion in this respect, as they are required to “ensure that material
transactions with related parties are approved by the general meeting or by the administrative or
supervisory body of the company according to procedures which prevent the related party from
taking advantage of its position and provide adequate protection for the interests of the company
and of the shareholders who are not a related party, including minority shareholders,” and without
the participation of the director or the shareholder who is a related party. See SRD II, supra note
105, at Art. 9(c)(4). However, some Member States—amongst which Italy: see supra note 162
and accompanying text—adopted wide-ranging regulations on related-party transactions,
including detailed provisions involving independent directors in the decision-making process for
related party transactions and, in some cases, empowering dissenting minorities to prevent the
transaction. On the Italian regime for related party transactions see Strampelli, supra note 115, at
144–45; see also infra Part III. References to the UK and French regimes are provided by
Enriques et al., supra note 169, at 157.
232. As is notably the case under Delaware law, see supra Part V.
233. See Marcello Bianchi, Angela Ciavarella, Luca Enriques, Valerio Novembre & Rossella
Signoretti, Regulation and Self-Regulation of Related Party Transactions in Italy - An Empirical
Analysis 25 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI), Finance Working Paper No. 415/2014, 2014),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2383237. It should be noted that under Italian law, Consob Regulation
No. 17221 on related party transactions introduced both stricter procedural requirements and
heightened disclosure obligations, however leaving some freedom to the board of directors in
drawing the individual company’s internal code: in fact, the board is allowed to opt-up or optdown from some of the provisions set forth in the regulation as defaults. See supra note 162 and
accompanying text.
234. See Bianchi et al., supra note 233, at 25 (also finding that, to the contrary, the degree of
board independence, as measured by the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board,
does not have an impact on the strictness of such internal codes).
235. See Marco Ventoruzzo, Empowering Shareholders in Directors’ Elections: A Revolution
in the Making, 8 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 105, 141 (2011); Strampelli, supra note 115, at 135–36;
see also infra Part III.
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to support the hypothesis that non-executive minority directors reduce
principal-principal agency costs associated with controllers’ potential selfdealing, and positively affect firm value, “even in presence of factors
(uncertainty about future financial results and high information asymmetry)
that might exacerbate the risk of hold-up by minority shareholders.” 236
Thus, “the benefits associated to the active monitoring role by the
independent minority directors outweigh the costs of potential frictions
within the board . . . .” 237
However, the rise of activist shareholders, coupled with increased
regulatory and market pressure on mainstream institutional investors for
more active stewardship and engagement 238 and, as a consequence,
increased voter turnout at (European) shareholders’ meetings, have proven
to help turn slate voting—conceived of as a regulatory tool for protecting
minority institutional investors—into a potent device for challenging boards
and de facto controlling shareholders in a potentially disruptive manner. 239
236. Nicola Moscariello, Michele Pizzo, Dmytro Govorun & Alexander Kostyuk,
Independent Minority Directors and Firm Value in a Principal–Principal Agency Setting:
Evidence from Italy, J. MGMT. GOVERNANCE 18–19 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997018-9421-0.
237. Id.
238. For Europe, see Council Directive 2017/828, Recitals (14)–(18), 2017 O.J. (L 132)
(emphasizing the need for effective and sustainable shareholder engagement to “ensur[e] a more
long-term approach by listed companies” and strongly encouraging asset managers and
institutional investors to perform a stewardship function and exercise shareholder rights by
requiring them—on a comply-or-explain basis—to publicly disclose their investment strategies
and engagement policies, including through voting, and to publicly report on the implementation
thereof, including a description of the votes cast). A similar bend towards promoting institutional
investor engagement is also present in the United States, where starting from 1998, federal
regulatory responses to weak institutional investors’ voting incentives had the effect of changing
institutions’ pattern of voting. See Jill. E. Fisch & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration
21–22 (U. of Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 18-22; Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst.
(ECGI), Law Working Paper No. 415/2018, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227113 (noting that
“[b]oth investors and issuers are participating in a growing number of private initiatives aimed at
promoting board-shareholder collaboration on a variety of issues and, in particular, corporate
governance matters”; specifically, reference is made to initiatives such as the 2014 “ShareholderDirector Exchange Program (SDX)” and the 2017 “Investor Stewardship Group (ISG)”); Edelman
et al., supra note 26, at 1395–97.
239. It is worth noting that in the practice of slate voting, institutional investors usually submit
“short slates” of director nominees to be voted on at the shareholders’ meeting. See Simone
Alvaro & Filippo Annunziata, Shareholdings of Alternative Investment Funds in Listed
Companies and in Banks: A Legal Perspective 15 (Consob, Legal Research Paper No. 17, 2018),
http://www.consob.it/documents/46180/46181/lp17.pdf/2ca235bc-17a1-4bda-9efb-569d9ff361b8
(emphasizing the fact that UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable
Securities) funds submitting short slates of director nominees can have some unexpected corporate
governance consequences, as illustrated in a number of cases where those lists “obtained the
relative majority of votes, overruling the list submitted by the . . . majority shareholders, but did
not obtain the majority of directors precisely because it was composed of a number of candidates
less than half of the number of directors to be appointed”); Strampelli, supra note 115, at 135–36.
Traditional institutional shareholders do not submit long slates of director nominees in order to
avoid qualifying as a controlling shareholder: in fact, the regulatory framework for acquisition of
major holdings or control in European listed companies applicable to traditional UCITS funds—
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Against this backdrop, hedge fund board representation is viewed as “a
potential solution to the problem of shareholder-manager agency costs” at
widely held corporations. 240 Similarly, hedge fund minority board
representation helps to reduce majority-minority shareholder agency costs
at de jure controlled companies. 241 By definition, where there is de jure
control, any board representation granted to activists, e.g., through slate
voting systems, can only be minority representation, given that the
controller’s uncontestable voting power will always secure the majority of
the board seats for controller-appointed directors. 242
The same does not always apply for de facto controlled companies,
where the circumstances mentioned above lead activist-appointed directors
to secure a majority of the board seats.243 In general terms, activist minority
board representation is also beneficial at de facto controlled companies.
However, majority board representation that is premised on a small equity
stake held by the appointing activist in conjunction with the presence of a
much larger, but disempowered, shareholder can arguably result in an
inefficient corporate governance structure. In fact, the disempowerment of
the de facto controller does not result either from a shift of corporate
control, or from any change in the allocation of control and cash-flow rights
agreed upon between that shareholder and minority stockholders; instead,
by leveraging minority rights and the teaming up phenomenon, the activist
can secure a better deal in terms of (de facto) control rights without paying
the price of building up a corresponding stake in terms of cash-flow
rights. 244

but not to alternative funds reserved to professional investors (AIFs, such as hedge funds)—
prevents mutual UCITS funds from acquiring or exercising control (or significant influence) over
investee companies in order to limit risk concentration. See Simone Alvaro & Filippo Annunziata,
Shareholdings of Alternative Investment Funds in Listed Companies and in Banks: A Legal
Perspective
14
(Consob,
Legal
Research
Paper
No.
17,
2018),
http://www.consob.it/documents/46180/46181/lp17.pdf/2ca235bc-17a1-4bda-9efb-569d9ff361b8.
This, in turn, helps explain why hedge funds may submit long, or even full, slates of director
nominees to shareholder vote.
240. Christie, supra note 124, at 3.
241. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 109, at 1277 (arguing that, to limit controllers’
opportunism, public investors should have “some degree of influence” over the appointment of
some “enhanced-independence directors” who would “lack the incentives produced by the
controller’s decisive influence over the directors’ appointment and retention and . . . have some
incentives that flow from making the directors accountable to public investors”). In particular,
public investors should be empowered to determine or at least substantially influence the election
or retention of these directors. Id.
242. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 226, at 600 (noting that “[c]ontrollers’ voting power
enables them to appoint any candidate they wish to the board”).
243. See supra Part IV.
244. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 226, at 560 (“challenging the prevailing model of
controlling shareholders as essentially opportunistic actors” and contending that “corporate law
for publicly traded firms with controlling shareholders”—where cash flow rights and control
rights are bundled together—”should balance the controller’s need to secure her idiosyncratic
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Therefore, the ordinary balance of powers between minority and
majority shareholders can actually be reversed. Minority activist
shareholders are turned (at least in the short run) into stockholders that can
dictate the strategic direction of the firm and, potentially, exert substantial
influence over the board of directors. 245 Conversely, the largest shareholder
becomes largely disempowered at the board level despite maintaining the
same proportion of voting rights it had before losing control over the board,
and is thus constrained to a monitoring role ordinarily performed by
minorities. 246
Peculiar as it may be, such a situation is likely to result in instability at
the corporate-governance level. First, potentially conflicting idiosyncratic
visions at the board level in terms of business strategies might prevent the
business from running smoothly. As directors appointed by different
shareholder groups can have different priorities, this factor raises concerns
about the board’s cohesiveness. 247 In itself, this concern applies anytime the
board includes minority-elected directors. However, the peculiar setting of a
majority of directors appointed by a minority shareholder facing a minority
of directors appointed by a stockholder still retaining the majority of voting
rights might enhance the potential for conflicts within the board. Second,
activist majority board representation still does not ensure that the views of
a number of fellow shareholders will converge when voting on matters
other than corporate elections in such a way as to continue to offset the
largest shareholder’s voting power. In reality, the presence of a shareholder
that still retains both minority board representation and the largest share of
voting power, so as to credibly threaten replacement of the board, might
hinder the implementation of any business strategies announced by the
activist. Furthermore, were any midstream changes to the business
strategies announced at corporate elections to be introduced, mainstream
institutional investors might withdraw support from the board and enhance
the seriousness of the threat of replacement.
At the same time, it might not be an option for the activist to force
through its agenda by positively exerting substantial influence over
corporate decision-makers. This is because the activist could be considered
a de facto controlling shareholder, 248 thus resulting in the additional costs
associated with controlling shareholder status. Those costs could perhaps be
relatively limited in terms of the potential controller self-dealing litigation
costs, given that “hedge funds are, to a much greater extent than mutual
funds, free from the most significant potential sources of conflicts of
vision against the minority’s need for protection,” and hence that paying heed to the rights of the
controlling shareholders is important).
245. See supra Part IV.
246. See supra Part IV.
247. See Black & Kraakman, supra note 225, at 1949; Strampelli, supra note 115, at 126.
248. See supra Part V.

386

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 13

interest.” 249 However, they cannot be excluded and remain a factor to be
reckoned with. 250 Moreover, further categories of cost associated with the
controller status must be taken into account, such as those—an examination
of which falls outside the scope of this Article—arising as a result of
accounting and tax regulation.
At the end of the day, the activist might not be able, as a matter of fact,
to exert an influence as substantial as might appear at a first glance;
similarly, the largest shareholder might not be as disempowered as at first
may seem. The truth is that mainstream institutional investors, whose votes
crucially allowed the activist to win control over the board of directors, are
bound to remain pivotal even in the aftermath of the successful activist
intervention.
In general terms, the largest shareholder might be expected to operate
actively as a disciplinary force, since the threat of replacement should
mitigate the risk of and disincentivize the activist from acting in a manner
that runs contrary to the interests of the largest shareholder. 251 However, the
largest shareholder’s interests are not necessarily aligned with those of
minority institutional investors. 252 Arguably, had the controller’s interests
been aligned with those of the minority shareholders, institutional investors
would not have been so likely to have supported the activists’ candidates
for directors. Hence, monitoring by public investors remains essential
within the corporate governance structure under consideration.
In addition, it must not be forgotten that the activist still qualifies as a
“small-minority” shareholder in terms of its cash flow rights—at any rate,
significantly smaller than the largest shareholder.253 This factor exposes the
activist to greater incentives to extract private benefits than the largest
shareholder. 254 This is not to say that the empowered activist would
necessarily take advantage of its influence in order to pursue business
strategies that meet selfish interests to the detriment of long-term
performance, or that further other opportunistic objectives. It may well be
that the activist will remain committed—also due to reputational
249. Edelman et al., supra note 26, at 1409 (“[I]n contrast to mutual funds, hedge funds do not
sell products to the target firms whose shares they hold. Unlike government pension funds, hedge
funds are not subject to extensive political control. As a result, hedge funds are in a good position
to monitor corporate boards.”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1067, 1071.
250. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1071 (explaining that hedge funds might influence a
decision at the company to improve the value of its position at another portfolio company in a way
that does not align with the interests of other shareholders, and illustrating further “hedgingrelated conflicts”).
251. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers 9 (Eur.
Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI), Working Paper No. 434, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128375.
252. See Kastiel, supra note 110, at 118–19.
253. In reference to the non-coinciding case of dual-class-company controllers, see id. at 2
(defining a “small-minority” stake as one below 15% of equity capital, a “very-small-minority” as
below 10%, and a “tiny-minority” stake as below 5%).
254. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 226, at 591.
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considerations 255—to pursuing “constructivist” strategies. 256 Nonetheless,
the activist’s heightened exposure to opportunistic incentives calls, once
again, for effective institutional investor monitoring.
It is naturally the case that the teaming up phenomenon may serve “as
an additional check on the validity and long-term viability of the activists’
plans.” 257 In effect, the activist
must convince fellow shareholders that their ideas are beneficial for the
entirety of the shareholders, including the typically long-term oriented
pension funds. But this step additionally amounts to a de facto “vetting
process,” whereby checks and balances are created: if and insofar as
activists need to convince other funds that their strategic plans are
beneficial for the company as such (and do not create idiosyncratic
benefits for the hedge fund), this process mitigates the potential extraction
of short-term private benefits and ensures that activism is channeled into
mutually beneficial activities. 258

However, for such a system of checks and balances to make good on
the promise of a long-term focus and value creation, effective institutional
shareholder scrutiny must occur not only when the activist seeks
institutions’ voting support, but also after the successful activist
intervention. It is however questionable whether mainstream institutional
investors should be expected to perform an effective gatekeeping function;
in fact, whether fundamentally passive, or “rationally reticent,” 259 investors
will actually act as active stewards is still open to debate.
Institutional investors, especially passive investors that cannot exit
strategically, 260 are often looked upon as actors with few incentives to
invest in stewardship and limited resources to engage with investee
companies. 261 Regulation itself would encourage institutions “to outsource
oversight of the corporations in their portfolios to activist hedge funds and
proxy advisory firms such as ISS,” or, at any rate, to act as poor
gatekeepers, being “themselves measured and compensated by short-term,
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See Fisch & Sepe, supra note 238, at 21–22.
Ringe, supra note 96, at 419.
Id. at 420.
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 26, at 895 (defining rational reticence as institutions’
inclination to not make proposals themselves but instead supportively respond to other investors’
proposals as a consequence of the costs incurred from actively engaging with investee companies,
which, owing to their business model, reduces returns while fueling other competitors’ free-riding,
hence disincentivizing active conduct).
260. Quasi-indexers can be viewed as the most loyal shareholders, since they remain committed
in their investments over the long term; passive investors are the largest category of investors. See,
e.g., Alessio Pacces, Exit, Voice and Loyalty from the Perspective of Hedge Funds Activism in
Corporate Governance, 9 ERASMUS L. REV. 199, 208 (2016).
261. See Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 373–74 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg
Ringe eds., 2018).
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quarterly portfolio performance, and . . . generally agents and subject to
misaligned incentives.” 262
This negative view of institutional investors as monitors may be
overstated. Nevertheless, the fact remains that active stewardship is a costly
endeavor that cannot easily be aligned with investors’ prevailing business
models—primarily based on asset diversification and, as a consequence,
portfolio fragmentation—and incentive structures. 263 The inadequate
incentives hypothesis points to a number of factors which characterize the
industry structure as the primary explanation for traditional institutions’
insufficient levels of serious engagement: the highly competitive structure
of the market for money managers, which pressures towards lowering costs;
rational apathy and the free rider problem; institutions’ revenue model
which, being typically a percentage of assets under management, pushes
towards increasing funds’ size and complexity; asset managers’ perverse
incentives associated with a fund’s relative performance, which improves
where underweighted portfolio companies perform badly; the enduring
conviction that being involved in corporate governance reduces the
resources to be better employed in selecting investments in order to increase
fund performance—and portfolio managers’ compensation; and various
conflicts of interests asset managers are faced with. 264 In spite of their
decisive role in providing support to successful activist campaigns, it is
therefore unclear whether institutional investors, especially passive
investors, interact adequately with activists. 265 Most notably, passive
investors mainly focus on issues (such as environmental, social and
governance (ESG) issues)
requiring low-cost interventions although they refrain from engaging in
high-cost governance activities such as monitoring of M&A or presenting
slates of candidates for election to the board of directors. Consequently,
given the collective action problems facing the investment industry, active
fund managers have no more incentive to invest in stewardship than

262. Lipton, supra note 94.
263. See Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance

Consequences of Passive Investing, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 803, 819–20 (2018).
264. Rock, supra note 261, at 373–74.
265. See Alessio M. Pacces, Hedge Fund Activism and the Revision of the Shareholder Rights
Directive 14–16 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI), Law Working Paper No. 353/2017, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2953992 (“[I]ndex fund managers do not benefit from firm-specific
screening. Because their income depends on the size of their portfolio, they choose low-cost
voting policies that investors appreciate overall, including best practices in corporate
governance.”) Hence, whether they are the right arbiters for the choice between the opposing
views of the hedge funds and the incumbent management largely depends on the particular
context. Id.
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passive investors do because investment does not lead to any significant
improvement in their relative performance. 266

The fact that, over the last few years, large institutional investors
committed to strengthening their in-house governance and engagement
departments, and dedicated to collecting firm-specific information, might
certainly have reduced their criticized reliance on proxy advisory services—
the accurateness of which remains unclear, given the substantial lack of
transparency in this respect 267—and helped to increase independent
monitoring over investee companies. 268 In effect, the number of
engagements with investee companies performed by larger investors is
high. 269 Not less importantly, however, the number of such engagements is
limited when compared to the number of their portfolio companies. 270
Moreover, stewardship teams “rarely engage with companies concerning
business related strategies, as this would give rise to significant costs.” 271
Hence, where activist intervention is motivated by disagreement about the
company’s strategy, “the strategy proposed by hedge funds in opposition to
the incumbent management is particularly difficult to evaluate,” since it
entails an “entrepreneurship question that indexed funds, with their
typically small stakes in a particular company, do not have the expertise and
the incentives to answer.” 272
Therefore, it seems to be quite unclear whether institutional investors,
especially passive investors, have any incentive to scrutinize the activist
proposals adequately, 273 and will actually “operate as an important
safeguard when activist proposals may not be in the best interest of the
company” 274 and, especially, exert valuable and continuous oversight over
influential corporate decision-makers once the supported activist
intervention succeeds. Moreover, considering that institutional investors are
hedge funds’ “main source of investment capital,” institutions may have “a
266. Strampelli, supra note 263, at 835 (further highlighting the paradoxical consequence that
the rise of investors focused on long-term value creation, such as passive index funds, may not
result in an effective and exhaustive system of checks and balances between the different
company organs and different stakeholders, especially in relation to operations more likely to
impinge upon the value of the company or its long-term perspectives).
267. See most recently James R. Copland, David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, The Big Thumb on
the Scale: An Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry 7 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stan.
U. Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance No. CGRP-72;
Stan.
U.
Graduate
Sch.
of
Bus.,
Research
Paper
No.
18-27,
2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3188174 (providing a comprehensive review of the proxy advisory
industry and the debate over proxy advisors’ influence on institutional clients’ voting behavior,
corporate choices, and voting outcomes).
268. See, e.g., Fisch & Sepe, supra note 238, at 15.
269. See Strampelli, supra note 263, at 824.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 825.
272. Pacces, supra note 260, at 210–11.
273. Strampelli, supra note 263, at 840.
274. See Christie, supra note 124, at 5.
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second interest in supporting hedge fund activism beyond the returns that
they generate in any particular company by voting in favor of activists’
agendas—a direct return on their investments in the hedge fund
themselves.” 275 As a consequence, where the activist proposal is valuemaximizing of its interest in the firm, but value-decreasing for the firm
overall, the institution might be incentivized to provide voting support to
maximize its investment in the fund instead of the value of the firm. 276
Of course, the dubious effectiveness of institutional investor monitoring
is not specific to de facto controlled companies, but equally concerns
widely held corporations as well. It seems, however, at companies in which
control is contestable, this factor can exacerbate the potential negative
corporate-governance effects of successful activist intervention.
Against this background, enhanced board independence obviously
becomes even more crucial, in that the board should act as “an independent
arbitrator” deciding whose views better serve the company’s interests. 277
However, despite meeting the (formal) requirements for board composition
as regards independence, directors and managers might still be subject to
biased influence from influential shareholders—whether an activist or the
largest shareholder 278—even though any director, once elected, is bound to
pursue the interests of the company as a whole, and not those of any of its
particular shareholders. 279 In effect, the prevalent regulatory trend towards a
275. Edelman et al., supra note 26, at 1417.
276. Id. at 1418. But see Rock, supra note 261, at 383 (noting that since major institutional

investors only invest in hedge funds after significant due diligence, this investment process
“provides some assurance to the general investment public of the activists’ bona fides”).
277. Sharfman, supra note 7, at 822 (discussing the link between board independence and the
ability of hedge funds to create long-term value, and arguing that “[a]n activist hedge fund can
create long-term value at a public company if the Board has enough independence to act as an
impartial arbitrator deciding between the advice provided by executive management and the
activist hedge fund”).
278. See, e.g., Luca Enriques, Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World
Challenges (With a Critique of the European Commission Proposal), 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV.
1, 18–19 (2014) (noting that even where a director is elected with the involvement of minority
shareholders, “substantial independence is not guaranteed, as that is mainly a function of an
individual’s assertiveness, ability not to succumb to boardroom biases, and reputational and career
concerns”); Edward B. Rock, MOM Approval in a World of Active Shareholders 8 (NYU Law and
Econ., Research Paper No. 18-02; Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI), Law Working Paper No.
389/2018, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3122681 (noting in the context of majority-of-minority
approval of related-party transactions that “[t]he ‘disinterested’ directors on the ISC [(Independent
Special Committee)] are ultimately elected by the controlling shareholder and thus may not be
genuinely disinterested”). For a similar view, see also Bianchi et al., supra note 233, at 8
(explaining that “the veto power of independent directors for all transactions regardless of their
size can be ineffective to protect minority shareholders from harmful RPTs [(Related Party
Transactions)] if directors do not act independently in practice”). For Delaware jurisprudence in
relation to de facto control see supra notes 190–194 and accompanying text.
279. See Piergaetano Marchetti, Gianfranco Siciliano & Marco Ventoruzzo, Dissenting
Directors, 18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 659, 670–71 (2017) (noting that “it is inevitable that
directors feel a stronger ‘affection’ for the shareholders that have contributed more to their
election”); Christie, supra note 124, at 14 (highlighting that “[a]ctivist appointed directors,
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formal approach to director independence mainly relies on independence in
appearance and “does not adequately consider the fact that independence
also touches upon a director’s behavior, and that the absence of personal,
business and financial links with the company, managers and—if
applicable—controlling shareholders is only a rough proxy for
independence.” 280 Moreover, as has been noted by Professors Fisch and
Sepe, “the emphasis placed on independence requirements in current rules
governing the board appointment process does sacrifice expertise
requirements. The result is that most independent directors lack the firmspecific human capital, knowledge and skills of executive directors and tend
instead to be ‘generalists.’” 281 Therefore, while board independence can
help, in that it might mediate between potentially opposing views regarding
the business strategies pursued, this factor does not overcome the need for
effective institutional investor oversight.
CONCLUSION
If, as many commentators predict, activism is here to stay, 282 it is likely
to increasingly target de facto controlled companies and companies with a
large, dominating blockholder; as a matter of fact, de facto control is
widespread in the European corporate landscape, and appears to be on the
rise in the United States. Consequently, the corporate-governance effects of
activism at de facto controlled companies appear to be a factor to reckon
with. Overall, the interplay between activism and de facto control—where
the regulatory framework grants substantial minority-empowering rights,
especially as regard board representation—can give room to instability, or
at least inefficiency, at the corporate-governance level following successful
activist intervention. In such cases, much will depend on the role played by
mainstream institutional investors and on the effectiveness of their
stewardship function: an area of research in which further investigation,
whether they are unaffiliated with the hedge fund or are the hedge fund managers themselves, still
have fiduciary duties to the company and cannot blindly pursue the activist agenda to the
detriment of the long-term success of the company”).
280. Strampelli, supra note 115, at 119 (emphasizing the need for incentives designed to nudge
truly independent conduct by directors); see also Yaron Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Case
for Improving Director Independence Disclosure, 43 J. CORP. L. 35, 53–56 (2017) (arguing that
the current approach to director independence—one that is focused on a set of criteria and
subsequent certification by the board of directors—is of an empty nature).
281. Fisch & Sepe, supra note 238, at 16.
282. See, e.g., Joel Slawotsky, Hedge Fund Activism in an Age of Global Collaboration and
Financial Innovation: The Need for a Regulatory Update of United States Disclosure Rules, 35
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 275, 279 (2015) (noting that some developments—including “the sheer
size of capital available to hedge funds, the globalization of financial markets, new investment
vehicles (such as derivatives), the rise of global cooperation among large funds and ‘wolf-pack’
tactics . . . are likely to further strengthen activism as a popular strategy among large investors”);
Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in
Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1015, 1020 (2014).
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both empirical and theoretical, is needed. At de facto controlled companies,
there is a risk for successful activist intervention to bring about a situation
of concentrated ownership characterized by both the disadvantages of not
having a tightly controlling shareholder (e.g., in terms of its higher
commitment to the firm and its entrepreneurial vision, which can potentially
benefit all investors) as well as those associated with contestable control (in
terms of the weak alignment of the interests of influential shareholders and
public shareholders). Moreover, the positive or negative consequences of
activism targeting de facto controlled companies go hand in hand with the
very debate concerning the positive or negative corporate effects of hedge
fund activism, which is as yet unresolved although—as most recently
argued by Professor Roe 283—the hedge-fund contributed stock-market
short-termism’s impact on corporations, workers, and savers might be
overstated. 284
By showing the potential negative implications for corporate
governance of activism at de facto controlled companies associated with,
amongst other factors, the usage of regulatory tools ensuring minority
shareholder board representation, this Article attempts to contribute to
framing the debate into ongoing shareholder-empowerment in the United
States against the particular background of possible interplay between
activism and de facto control. If comparative examination matters when
considering reform, 285 this Article warns to potential unexpected corporate
governance consequences of activism at de facto controlled companies
within a regulatory environment that ensures shareholder board
representation. In such context, the proposals by Professors Anabtawi and
Stout as to the need for reexamining conventional notions of shareholder
duties in such a way as to render the rules of loyalty duties—traditionally
applied to officers and directors and, sometimes, controlling shareholders—
applicable to activist minority investors might appear less radical than at
first sight. 286
Finally, this Article potentially complements the skeptical view of
shareholder engagement and the regulatory and self-regulatory tendency—
which is apparent in the EU and on the rise in the United States—towards
283. See Mark J. Roe, Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact 1, 4 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst.
(ECGI), Law Working Paper No. 426/2018, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3171090 (showing
that “every major predicted consequence from the short-term argument either has not been shown
(where is there a discernible economy wide hit to R&D?), is false (cash is not draining out and the
stock market is not shunning long-term firms), or is better explained otherwise (capital
expenditures are down even where stock markets are less important),” and therefore arguing that
“the calamitous form of the stock-market-driven short-termist argument needs to be reconsidered,
recalibrated, and, quite plausibly, rejected”).
284. See supra Part I.
285. See Nili, supra note 25, at 211.
286. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1256 (2008); supra Part II.
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the positive promotion of institutional investor engagement with investee
companies, while at the same time failing to adequately address the issue of
the costs of such engagement as the major obstacle to active stewardship.
The risk of incentivizing engagement by institutions in unitary terms
without also adopting regulatory strategies that favor a reduction in
engagement-related costs 287 is that it may induce institutions to support
hedge fund activist intervention, and neglect taking part in adequate
monitoring. At weakly controlled companies, this can enhance dubious
corporate-governance effects.

287. See Strampelli, supra note 263, at 845–851 (outlining potential regulatory strategies aimed
at stimulating more active involvement by passive investors by favoring a reduction in
engagement-related costs, and favoring, in particular, an approach aimed at promoting a
redistribution of engagement costs between active and passive institutional investors by
incentivizing collective engagement). Specifically, overcoming possible collective action
problems by facilitating collective engagement could foster more effective involvement by
mainstream non-activist institutions’ in the corporate governance of investee companies, as
engagement costs would be shared between the investors that collectively undertake engagement
initiatives in non-routine issues, such as proxy contests, or M&A and related-party transactions.
Id. Collective engagement could also incentivize institutional investors to adequately scrutinize
activists’ proposals, which would render interaction between activist and non-activist investors
more effective. Id.

